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Abstract 
This thesis aims to shed new light on the usage of Europeanisation as a framework 
within which to evaluate the consequences of neighbourhood Europeanisation. This is 
done by looking at the diffusion of European values towards the EU’s Southern ENP 
Partners in the period of 2007 up and until 2013. A comparative case study is drawn, 
assessing the normative or structural nature of the Union’s narrative brought out by 
examining the reflections of the rapporteurs of the European Commission pertaining to 
the diffusion of the centrality of peace, democracy, and rule of law onto the Union’s 
Southern ENP Partner States through the European Neighbourhood Policy. Discussion 
of the two case studies of Morocco and Egypt presented show reflection of a normative 
approach by the EU, but also indicate that normative diffusion can only be effective if 
the necessary instruments are sufficiently developed. 
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 Introduction 
On December 6th 2002, then-President of the European Commission Romano Prodi held 
a speech in which he advocated for the creation of a new, attractive, motivating, 
dynamic external policy towards the countries that were in the direct proximity of the 
European Union’s (henceforth: EU) territorial boundaries, which would serve the 
distinct purpose of fostering stability, security, and prosperity (Prodi, 2002: 5). 
He looked at the imminent Eastward expansion of the European Union that would take 
place two years later and emphasised the changes that this would bring for Europe and 
the world, adding a new dimension to the European project and imposing upon the EU 
new responsibilities in the fields of security and sustainable stability (Prodi, 2002: 2).  
Prodi lauded the EU enlargement’s contributary role in facilitating the expansion of 
these two fields, but also saw the new challenges that enlargement brought in the wider 
proximity of the EU and territorial limitations that enlargement of the EU would 
inevitably bring about (Prodi, 2002: 3). Notably, he provided a geographical scope of 
the proposed change in relations in which spoke of his hope of seeing the formation of 
what he described as a “ring of friends”, a diverse band of countries around the EU that 
engaged in friendly relations with the Union and one another (Prodi, 2002:4). With the 
thought of “sharing everything with the Union but institutions” in mind, the 
Commission set out to identify the best approach towards realising a framework within 
which common goals, peacebuilding and the fortification of the economies of both the 
European Union and its bordering countries would be secured by exporting the Union’s 
principles, values, and standards to its neighbours (Prodi, 2002: 5,6).  
The concrete outcome of the challenge posed at the time can be found in what is now 
known as the European Neighbourhood Policy (henceforth: ENP), a piece of European 
Union Foreign Policy of which the legal basis is contained in a combination of bilateral 
and multilateral agreements instigated by the Council, but finds execution through soft 
law that is derived from a combination of spoken and written commitments made by 
both the Council and the Commission (Šišková , 2014:63). In instances of engagement 
by the EU as an actor in foreign relations, it is bound by Article 21 of the Treaty on 
European Union, which stipulates the EU’s guiding principles when engaging in such 
relations. These concern the advancement of democracy, the rule of law, and human 
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rights and fundamental freedom protections, respecting human dignity, abiding by the 
principles of equality and solidarity, and upholding international law (European Union, 
2012:28) . 
In 2011, Catherine Ashton, the then-High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, published a review of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
in response to the EU’s seemingly standing by as conflicts and challenges flared up in 
its Eastern and Southern neighbourhood (European Commission, 2011:1) that offered 
Southern ENP Partner States “a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity” 
vested on the elements of democratic transformation and institution-building, 
strengthening the civil society, and fostering sustainable and inclusive economic growth 
(European Commission, 2011:3).  In order to realign the EU’s actions with its guiding 
principles, a series of adaptations were made to the EU’s approach towards its Partner 
States, introducing a stricter conditionality regime later dubbed the ‘more for more’ 
principle, in which an increase in EU support would be made conditional to progressive 
reforms reflecting their commitment to universal values. This allowed for differentiation 
in approaches between the EU and individual Partner States based on the extent to 
which the Partner State implements realises the priorities laid out in the Action Plans. 
(European Commission, 2011:2). 
Contemporary debates on the workings of the European Union’s handlings of foreign 
affairs often lean on some form of up- or downloading of EU policies, norms, and 
values to or from external actors.  It is the objective of this thesis to analyse the extent to 
which the narrative put out by the EU towards its Southern ENP Partner States is based 
on normative values of the European Union and its member States, or whether it is 
vested in the pursuit of rational interests. More concretely, the aim is to analyse the 
normative and rational influences affecting the nature of the EU’s approach towards its 
ENP Partner States. I will rely on Europeanisation theory as the umbrella framework 
within which the two respective theoretical approaches towards explaining the narrative 
are explored. 
By means of a comparative case study, this thesis will fill in a gap in the knowledge by 
testing if the theory can be used to explain the manner in which the narrative 
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surrounding the Union’s actions towards its Southern ENP Partner States can be 
explored.  
For this purpose, a categorical central research question has been formulated, out of 
which flow two hypotheses.  
The central research question this thesis seeks to answer is: 
“Does the EU's narrative reflect a more value-based or interest-based approach 
towards the Southern neighbourhood?” 
 
This question seeks to find whether changes in domestic policy by Southern ENP 
Partner States come about as a result of the European Neighbourhood Policy will affect 
the EU’s attitude towards the region. It does so by looking at the extent to which the EU 
was successful in norm diffusion by means of the ENP Action Plans. 
Consequently, the hypotheses that need to be tested are as follows: The first hypothesis 
is that (1) the EU has been prioritising a values-based approach narrative towards the 
Southern neighbourhood. The second hypothesis is that (2) the EU has been prioritising 
an interest-based approach narrative towards the Southern neighbourhood. 
Though these hypotheses are, in principle, mutually exclusive, one of the expected 
research outcomes is that that at least a limited extent of overlap between the two will 
be observed. The substantiation of the hypotheses will depend on the extent to which 
the impact of the EU’s actions in the respective States of Morocco and Egypt aligns 
with its written objectives. 
  Road map and source justification 
This thesis consists of five substantive chapters and a conclusion.  
The first chapter provides an extensive theoretical background on Europeanisation and 
the IR theories of constructivism and rationalism. Here, the manner in which the 
analytical framework of Europeanisation will be operationalised and explored from a 
constructive and realist perspective will be laid out. 
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The second chapter provides a historical background of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and the Arab Spring, which was a major contributing factor in the revision of the 
ENP instrument in 2011 and the inclusion of the more-for-more principle. 
The third chapter contains the methodology. Here, the approach towards carrying out 
the empirical study is elaborated upon. The purpose of this chapter is to bridge the gap 
between the theoretical framework and the empirical case studies. 
The fourth chapter delves into the empirical cases of Morocco’s and Egypt’s efforts to 
meet the EU’s expectations in diffusing the values and norms identified in the second 
chapter, and goes on to compare these to discuss the differences between the two. 
The fifth chapter consists of the conclusion that is drawn following the examination and 
comparison of the case studies explored in chapter four. 
Finally, after concluding this thesis, a list of consulted literature and other source 
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1. Conceptualising and operationalising the analytical 
framework 
Before measuring the effects of the ENP on EU-Southern ENP Partner State relations, it 
is first necessary to formulate a theoretical and historical framework by defining several 
key terms. This chapter outlines the conceptual framework from which the rest of the 
thesis will be considered. Europeanisation will be conceptualised and operationalised, 
and the international relations theories of constructivism and realism will be put forward 
to substantiate the two differing hypotheses.  
1.1 Europeanisation 
Europeanisation is an analytical framework, incorporating constructivist and rationalist 
approaches towards data interpretation (Featherstone, 2003:12) that can be applied to 
examine changes in national institutions and policy that take place in response to policy 
practices that have been institutionalised on the European Union, specifically 
concerning the interaction between the EU and the state being studied in the areas of 
European rules, mechanisms and agreements (Coppieters et al., 2004:19). It serves to 
provide understanding of the role of domestic politics in processes of European 
integration (Radaelli, 2004:3), and is only suitable when pursuing research from the 
baseline that European integration is an ongoing process, bypassing the ontological 
discussion on whether or not and in what shape political integration takes place 
(Radaelli, 2004:2). In total, there are three main formats that define the area within 
which Europeanisation research takes place. These formats concern those of 
Membership Europeanisation, Enlargement Europeanisation, and Neighbourhood 
Europeanisation (Gawrich, Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2009:5). This thesis will focus 
on Neighbourhood Europeanisation in particular. 
The study of the effects of Europeanisation on states that are not part of the EU is an 
underexplored domain of knowledge. Only recently have analyses that make use of the 
analytical framework of Europeanisation had their horizons expanded to include non-
EU countries (Sedelmeijer, 2011:5). This research paper’s focus is on the narrative of 
the EU illustrated through contemporary Europeanisation, thus historic definitions of 
Europeanisation that predate the European Coal and Steel Community will be foregone 
in favour of terminology that describes Europeanisation that has taken place following 
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the post-WWII rapprochement of European nation states in response to the 
comeuppance of the economic and political union (Radaelli, 2004:4). Applying the 
concept of Europeanisation allows one to describe a series of complementary 
phenomena and processes of change, but the term itself is a versatile one, which has 
garnished a variety of definitions and is employed in a broad sense (Olsen, 2002:923). 
Because of this, the term runs the risk of being ascribed too many relations, which 
undermines its clarity and validity (Radaelli, 2000:5). For this reason, it is important to 
accurately conceptualise and operationalise the term. 
1.1.1 Conceptualising Europeanisation 
The wide array of conceptualisations of, and vibrant debates on what Europeanisation 
entails (Radaelli, 2004: 28) makes it challenging to accurately define it. Kassim 
(2000:238) explored the width of the term’s usage and concluded that the extent to 
which the conceptualisations had been stretched had led to its futility, whereas Olsen 
(2002:921, 950-951) found the term unsuitable as an explanatory concept, but also 
showed the term’s potential to be used as a conceptual framework from which to 
explore the transformation of the European political order. This was done by redefining 
Europeanisation as a set of model-building puzzles that allow for empirical testing 
defined indicators (Olsen, 2002:944).  
Looking at early attempts towards incorporating elements of different approaches to 
allow for the examination of the impact of the EU on domestic policies show a gradual 
development towards a more comprehensive definition of the term ‘Europeanisation’.  
Ladrech (1994:69) defined it as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and 
shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of 
the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making”, and pushed for a new 
way of assessing the effects of Europeanisation where the traditional top-down 
approach is foregone in favour of a bottoms-up approach which emphasises “national-
specific adaptation to cross-national inputs”(Ladrech, 1994:69, 70). This definition was 
subsequently superseded by Green Cowles, Caparoso, & Risse (2001:3), further 
delineating the definition of Europeanisation as “the emergence and development at the 
European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social 
institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among 
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the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European 
rules”. Like Ladrech, Green Cowles et al distinguished between a top-down and a 
bottom-up process. However, in stark contrast to Ladrech’s observations, Green Cowles 
et al take a different approach towards categorising the processes of Europeanisation. 
Their claim rests on the idea that the “emergence and development at the European level 
of distinctive structures of governance” constituted a bottom-up process, and instead 
argue that the analysation of top-down processes did not occur until the field was 
established enough for “stimuli and commitments” from the European level to trickle 
down and enact policy change on the national level (de Flers & Müller, 2010:4, Green 
Cowles et al, 2001:3).  
 
Radaelli (2003:28-30) divides the literary disagreement on defining and conceptualising 
Europeanisation into two distinct camps. The first focuses on the implicit, pre-
ontological process of political integration, whereas the second approach bases itself on 
a more explicit, conceptually demarcated definition of the term ‘Europeanisation’ as a 
process, situation, or reaction following the instatement of institutions. 
Contextualisation of the first approach by Olsen (2002) led to the distinguishment 
between five contextual categories of phenomena that are referred to with 
Europeanisation. These are: 
 
Europeanisation as changes in external territorial 
boundaries – EU enlargement; 
Europeanisation as the development of institutions 
of governance at the European level; 
Europeanisation as central penetration of national 
and sub-national systems of governance; 
Europeanisation as exporting forms of political 
organisation and governance tha tare typical and 
distinct for Europe beyond the European territory; 
Europeanisation as a political project aiming at a 
unified and politically stronger Europe 
Table: Five possible uses of Europeanisation, Olson (2002:923-924) 
An alternative set of definitions that explain the term ‘Europeanisation’ was formulated 
by Buller & Gamble (2002), namely:  
Europeanisation as the development of institutions 
of governance at the European level; 
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Europeanisation as the act of exporting distinct 
European forms of organisation and governance 
outside Europe’s territorial boundaries; 
Europeanisation as the achievement of political 
unification of Europe; 
Europeanisation as a process by which domestic 
politics becomes increasingly subjected to 
European policy-making; 
Europeanisation as a smokescreen for domestic 
policy manoeuvres.  
      Table: Buller & Gamble (2002: 13-15) 
 
Radaelli goes on to note three major challenges when outlining what Europeanisation 
entails. The first challenge he identifies is concept misinformation (Radaelli, 2003:28). 
He points out several shortcomings in definitions of Europeanisation offered by a 
variety of fellow academics, and, referring to Adcock and Collier (2001)’s 
differentiation between background concepts and systemised concepts, advocates in 
favour of a developing systemised concept for Europeanisation. As his chapter was 
addressed at EU-oriented political scientists, the European Union is the central subject 
of interest. He goes on to state that to use Europeanisation as an analytic framework, it 
is necessary for it to be clearly articulated and explicitly formulated. The reason for this 
is that the coverage of research themes under the background concept of 
Europeanisation is broad, whereas the systemised concept of Europeanisation enjoys 
clearer delineation, making it more applicable for researching purposes (Radaelli, 
2003:31).  
The second challenge is conceptual stretching, which delves deeper into the description 
of a concept through the properties of intension and extension, which intension referring 
to the ‘collection of properties covered by a concept’, and extension to ‘the class of 
entities to which the concept applies’ (Radaelli, 2003:32). These two properties 
undermine one another, so emphasis on the one comes at the cost of sacrificing the 
other. In case of Europeanisation, emphasis in research has been laid on extension, 
allowing for easy motivation of broad analytical grids and the identification of a wide 
array of processes and instances covered by it. The extension property allows us to 
make sense of the way in which the research subject interacts with other actors and 
properties, but the broadness of its scope does not allow for more narrow, delineated 
15 | P a g e  
 
research questions to be answered. The effect of this is called ‘degreeism’, which is 
defined by Sartori (1970) as encompassing the replacement of difference in kind with 
difference of degree. In the studies of Europeanisation, this replacement takes place 
when looking at Europeanisation as a spectrum within which policy change occurs, with 
different results and ideas being ascribed to relate to different levels or degrees of 
Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2003:32). 
By 2004, a working definition proposed by Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) defined 
Europeanisation as a post-ontological analytical framework consisting  of “processes of 
a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political 
structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2004:3). They also argue that its aim is to 
explain the level of “adaptation to Europe, without making bold predictions” (ibid), and 
that Europeanisation can be applied to bring understanding to the way in which 
domestic change is processed (ibid).  
An advantage of this working definition is that it purposely delineates the observable 
effects of Europeanisation as originating from observing the outcome that decisions 
come about from the EU policy process brings about in domestic affairs (Radaelli, 
2003:31), with its EU-centrism (Radaelli, 2004:1) validating it as a theory that can be 
used to examine the effects of the ENP. It also lends itself well to both the top-down 
design studies of changes taking place in domestic political systems brought about by 
engagement with EU institutions or policies (Graziano & Vink, 2013:36), as well as to 
bottom-up design studies. The former is a discipline which can be used to focus on 
understanding how implementing European policies affect the Member States by 
exposing the  way in which the flow of pressure from the EU finds itself facing 
intervening variables, which result in reactions and domestic change. This design study 
lends itself well for analysing domestic impact of the EU (Radaelli, 2004:4). The latter 
hones in on the specific role of an actor or an instance in the process of bringing about 
these changes (Radaelli, 2003:33), starting from interactions at the domestic level and 
measuring how a domestic system of interaction can have any of its main components 
changed by EU action (Radaelli, 2004:4-5). In the cases examined in this thesis, the way 
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the narrative put out by the EU is constructed will be tested by looking at how the ENP 
has resulted in concrete domestic level impact. This is a top-down approach 
emphasising the effects of Europeanisation on the domestic systems of the respective 
Partner States, and will allow for a comparison between the set goals and the realised 
policy change. 
1.1.2 Operationalising Neighbourhood Europeanisation 
The wide array of working definitions formulated by a broad range scholars, many of 
whom employing different theoretical frameworks, consisting of different measurable 
variables, have long restricted opportunities for a peer-reviewable, unitary approach 
towards foreign policy analysis using Europeanisation as the analytical framework. This 
view is corroborated by the 2009 review of academic literature on Europeanisation in 
foreign policy contained in de Flers and Müller’s working paper on “Applying the 
Concept of Europeanisation to the study of Foreign Policy” (de Flers & Müller, 2009:2). 
The central argument put forward by this paper is that there are opportunities for linking 
the as of yet separated disciplines into a more singular approach, where the emphasis 
should be laid on distinguishing between dimensions, outcomes, and mechanisms of 
Europeanisation, rather than re-inventing the wheel on a regular basis by actively 
differentiating between different ‘schools’ of Europeanisation (de Flers & Müller, 
2009:18). Thus, rather than developing a separate framework within which to assess the 
effects of Neighbourhood Europeanisation, this thesis will draw on existing frameworks 
and adapt them to be applicable on external actors. The level of adaptation and policy 
convergence lies central to gaining a deeper understanding of the downloading of EU 
policy into the domestic arena. 
 Building on preceding conceptualisations of Europeanisation, Wong and Hill (2011:2) 
specifies the three main aspects within which to gauge the presence and extent of 
Europeanisation, dividing them up into a top-down, a bottoms-up, and a transformative 
element. The first of the three aspects, policy adaptation and convergence, refers to the 
application of top-down policy diffusion in which “changes in national foreign policies 
caused by participation over time in foreign policymaking at the European level” (Wong 
and Hill, 2011:4) result in “adaptation to EU demands and cross-national policy 
convergence” (Wong and Hill, 2011:7). The second aspect, national projection, provides 
a bottoms-up projection of “national preferences, ideas, and policy models onto the 
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level of the EU” (Wong and Hill, 2011:4). Examining national projection brings into 
perspective the capability of individual Member States to have its national agenda 
projected onto that of the EU by looking at state attempts to increase how their 
behaviour is reflected in the influence they carry and the way they use the EU (Wong 
and Hill 2011:7). By causally linking the adaptation and policy convergence to the 
national projection, insights can be made in the country’s attitude towards policy change 
brought about through Europeanisation. The result of this is the third dimension, 
identity reconstruction, where bilateral interactions aimed at converging policy 
positions over a prolonged time (Hill and Wong, 2011:12) lead to the political identity 
of a country being reshaped through a “negotiated convergence in terms of policy goals, 
preferences, and even identity, between the national and the supranational” (Wong and 
Hill, 2011:4), which in turn leads to a convergence of shared values and national 
interests (Hill and Wong, 2011:7). Briefly put, Hill and Wong’s conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of Europeanisation can be used distinguish between the respective 
roles of values and interests that drive State actors to adopt EU policies into their 
national frameworks. 
All three aspects and their accompanying indicators are referred to in the table down 
below: 
Aspects of Europeanisation National Foreign Policy (FP) indicators 
1    Adaptation and Policy 
Convergence   
  
- Harmonization and transformation of 
a Member State to the needs and 





II    National Projection   
  
- National foreign policy of a member 
state affects and contributes to the 
development of a common European 
FP (‘uploading’)  
 
 
III   Identity reconstruction  
  
a) Increasing salience of European political agenda   
b) Adherence to common objectives  
c) Common policy obligations taking priority over 
national domaines réservés  
d) Internalization of EU membership and its 
integration process (‘EU-isation’)  
e) Organizational and procedural change in 
national bureaucracies  
 
a) State attempts to increase national influence in 
the world  
b) State attempts to influence foreign policies of 
other Member States  
c) State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella  
d) National FP uses the EU level as an influence 
multiplier  
 
a) Emergence of shared norms/values among 
policymaking elites in relation to international 
politics.  
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- Result of above two dimensions. 
Harmonisation process tending towards 
middle position; common EU interests 
are promoted (‘crossloading‘)  
 
b) Shared definitions of European and national 
interests   
c) Coordination reflex and ‘pendulum effect’ 
where ‘extreme’ national and EU positions are 
reconciled over time via bilateral and EU 
interactions 
Table: The Three Aspects of Europeanisation on National Foreign Policy, sources: Hill & Wong 
(2011:2); Wong (2007:326); Wong (2005:142); Tsardanidis and Stavridis (2005:220-224); Major and 
Pomorska (2005). 
Based on Wang’s operationalisation of the three aspects that make up the concept of 
Europeanisation and the division of their indicators, it can be established that specific 
aspects of Europeanisation as a base framework can be moulded and mixed to serve as a 
working framework from within which to approach a variety of top-down and bottom-
up research topics. The first and third aspects and their accompanying indicators used to 
measure their effects on national foreign policy fit the scope of a top-down oriented 
working framework within which this thesis aims to approach the research question 
posed. The second aspect is excluded from the working framework as the uploading of 
policies by the third-party sovereign States that altogether make up the Southern ENP 
Partner States to the ENP constitutes a bottoms-up contribution and thus falls outside of 
the scope of the top-down approach chosen for this thesis.  
However, this immediately raises a problem. The identity reconstruction in aspect 3 is 
dependent on the cumulation of the two that precede it. As the topic of research in this 
thesis concerns the supranational narrative, it is necessary to reframe the second aspect 
to reflect the supranational projection and their expected observable effects on national 
Foreign Policy. For the purpose the research framework of this thesis, the second aspect 
now reads: 
Aspects of Europeanisation EU Foreign Policy (FP) indicators 
II    Supranational Projection   
  
- Supranational foreign policy of EU 
institutions affect and contribute to the 
development of a common 
EuroMediterranean foreign policy 
(incentives and pressure) 
 
a) EU attempts to increase its influence in the 
Mediterranean region  
b) EU attempts to influence foreign policies of 
Southern ENP Partner States  
c) EU uses the ENP as a cover/umbrella  
d) EU institutions use FP as an influence multiplier  
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 (Table: adaptation of The Three Aspects of Europeanisation on National Foreign Policy, 
sources: Hill & Wong (2011:2); Wong (2007:326); Wong (2005:142); Tsardanidis and 
Stavridis (2005:220-224); Major and Pomorska (2005).  
This revision of the second aspect makes it possible to map out the impact of the 
projection of the EU’s preferences, ideas, and policy models onto the implementation of 
the Association Agreement by means of the European Neighbourhood Policy1, shedding 
light on the way in which the ENP as an instrument is used by the European Union to 
push its foreign policy agenda and on the trade-off between diffusing values and 
securing interests.  
Summarising, the term ‘Europeanisation’ is a post-ontological, multifaceted term that 
seeks to provide an analytical framework through which to assess processes of 
European integration. By exploring the causal relationship between policy adaptation 
and convergence and supranational projection, it is my expectation that it will be 
possible to highlight the normative and structural factors that lie at the basis of the EU’s 




1 Adaptation of “national preferences, ideas, and policy models onto the level of the EU” (Hill and Wong, 
2011:4) to reflect the EU’s perspective 
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1.2 EU as a Foreign Policy actor: Normative or structural power of the 
Union 
The European Union is an actor with its own foreign policy agenda, based on Title V of 
the Treaty on European Union. Through its actions on the international scene, the EU 
seeks to externally advance the principles of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental 
human right protections that guide it (European Union, 2012:28).  
The European Neighbourhood Policy is one of the instruments of Europeanisation in 
external relationships (Schimmelfennig, 2012:18), with the qualification brought about 
through the ENP’s objective of bringing to realisation the adoption of European norms 
and standards. Meanwhile, the EU acts as an actor seeking to use the ENP as a means to 
export its principles, normative standards, and regional integration model. Within this 
context, rather than assessing the impact of the Union on internal European integration, 
the impact of the Union on integration of European standards in the third country can be 
examined (Schneider, 2010:126). A dichotomous and somewhat contradictory 
distinction can be made when examining the causes and outcomes of Europeanisation. 
This distinction is between two approaches. The first approach is that of the European 
Union as a normative power. Here, the EU’s “lack of effective coercive power-politics 
instruments” and its “identity as such which fosters normative values such as 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law” are leading for establishing the Union’s 
foreign policy (Schneider, 2010:127). The second approach is that of the Union as a 
structural power. In this case, rational assessments of the Union’s own economic 
interests are leading its actions in foreign policy (Schneider: 2010:127). 
  1.2.1 A Union constructed of values: The EU as a normative power:  
One of the ways in which the European Union is said to carry its power in foreign 
relations is by employing a normative approach based on exporting the EU’s norms and 
values through its interactions with external actors, in effect projecting outwards its 
internal characteristics and identity (Schneider, 2010:125). This thesis will draw on Ian 
Manner’s theory of EU normative power, in which the EU’s “ability to shape 
conceptions of ‘normal’” constitutes a “normative power of an ideational nature 
characterised by common principles and a willingness to disregard Westphalian 
conventions” (Manners, 2002:239). 
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Ian Manners description of the role of the “ideational impact of the EU’s international 
identity/role as representing normative power” (Manners, 2002:238), observing that the 
historical context, hybrid polity, and political-legal constitution that the EU draws on to 
promote its norms differs from how other global actors carry their weight (Manners, 
2002:240). He then singles out five distinct priorities of the European Union that form 
the basis of its normative nature. These normative factors are the centrality of peace, the 
idea of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (Manners, 2002:242). Four further ‘minor norms’ are identified, 
consisting of the notion of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable 
development, and good governance (Manners, 2002:242). The normative basis of the 
European Union as explained by Manners is summarily presented in the table below: 
 
  (Source: Manners, 2002:243) 
The manner in which the EU shapes norm diffusion in international relations is the basis 
upon which the argument of the EU as a normative power rests (Manners, 2002:244). 
9This diffusion is can be explained by six factors, described in the table below. 
Factor Explanation Source 
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Procedural diffusion Diffusion of EU norms by means of 
institutionalising the relationship between the 





Transference Diffusion of EU norms by means of an 





Overt diffusion Diffusion of EU norms by means of physical 






Cultural filter Diffusion of EU norms by tying it to social 
and political identities of norm subjects 
Kinnvall, 
1995:61-71 
  (Source: Manners, 2002:244-245) 
1.2.2 A Union of rational interests: The EU as a structural power 
In stark contrast to the idea of the EU as a normative power, the idea of the European 
Union as a structural power is vested in the notion that the protection of its core 
interests in external relations reflect a ‘realist’ foreign policy (Oeter, 2013), an 
observation that can by substantiated by the formulation of Article 21 (2) sub a TEU, 
which binds the EU to “define and pursue common policies and actions, and work for a 
high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to safeguard 
its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity” (European 
Union, 2012). Here, the EU emphasises its objectives as being comprised of elements 
inherently tied to the EU, which can be read as exhibiting a sense of exceptionalism that 
in effect breaks the EU’s conduct apart from normative systems due to the 
incompatibility caused by differentiation between the equality of shared values and the 
individuality of securing interests (Blockmans and Koutrakos, 2018:405).  
The approach towards Europeanisation from the realist perspective is sometimes 
referred to as pragmatic, or constituting realpolitik. The concept of realpolitik finds its 
origin in the mid 19th century, when the German liberal ‘Ludwig von Rochau’ examined 
alternatives to liberal utopianism whilst nonetheless holding on to the core ideals of 
liberalism. What he came upon was a redefinition of how to pursue liberal goals, 
‘holding out a vision of the future and a guide for how to get there’ in a realistic way 
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(Bew, 2016:28).  Its key concerns consist of power relations and national security, 
pursued through the analysis of concrete situations and only in case of necessity. 
Realpolitik is a conservative tradition built on pragmatic compromise and explained 
through the logic of the consequences of undertaken action (Goldmann, 2012:12). 
1.2.2.1 From idealist to reactionist: Realpolitik with European characteristics 
In the aftermath of the irregular migration influx challenges that brought European 
solidarity to the brink of breaking, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, brought before the European 
Council the 2016 ‘Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy 
(EUGS)’. This document set out five core priorities for the Union to pursue in its external 
action. These priorities consist of strengthening and ensuring the security of the Union 
through translation of the commitments of Member States to mutual assistance and 
solidarity into action, investing in the resilience of states and societies by targeting the 
most acute cases of governmental, economic, societal and climate/energy fragility and 
the development of more effective migration policies for the Union, engaging in practical 
and principled peacebuilding by expanding the meaning and scope of the ‘comprehensive 
approach to conflicts and crises’, cooperating with regional organisations to allow regions 
that lie outside of the Union’s direct influence sphere to strengthen their position in the 
transnational arena, and focusing on the rule of law over the law of force as its global 
governance strategy through commitment to the United Nations and development of 
globally coordinated responses to crises. (Goldmann, 2016:9-10)  
This outlining of the Union’s external strategy signals a shift from the more idealist 
European Security Strategy (henceforth: ESS) of 2003, which was proactive of nature 
and aimed at building security through the spreading of good governance and 
democracy, to a more reactive modus operandum which appears to find a large portion 
of its external policy to be based on more pragmatic and situational analyses.  Where the 
ESS was formulated on the auspices of promoting European values and ethics to a 
broader, external society as a means of creating internal stability, the EUGS takes a 
more moderate approach in which it is guided by positions taken through ‘principled 
pragmatism, stemming from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment 
as well as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world’ (Goldmann, 2016:8) 
Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, lecturer at Gent University and director of the Europe in the 
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World programme at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in 
Brussels, identifies this shift as representing a return to interest-realpolitik, albeit with 
European characteristics (Biscop, 2016:92). He explains this shift through the example 
of the focus on Europe’s internal and border security as an indispensable requirement 
for the Union to retain credibility amongst its citizens and Member States coming about 
as a reaction to  the refugee crisis and terror attacks taking place in the territory of the 
Union (Biscop, 2016:92). 
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2. Historical background 
The second chapter starts off  with an exploration of the way in which the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership has developed since its inception, operationalising the set of 
indicators used to measure the independent variable by identifying the categorical 
indicators contained in the Barcelona Declaration in preparation for comparing them to 
those contained in the country-specific association agreements. Next, the method chosen 
to measure the effectiveness of policies undertaken within the auspices of the ENP is 
explained,  
In order to facilitate this, the historical background will also delve into the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Arab Spring. 
2.1 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: from Barcelona to Paris 
The dawn of the 1990s saw the global power dynamics upheaved in many ways. One of 
the results of this upheaval was a paradigm shift in the characterisation of the 
Mediterranean, a shift which saw, amongst other effects, a newly-found prioritisation on 
regional security come about (Kukushev, 2010:78). At the same time, democracy-
building and the protection of human rights started making its way to the forefront of 
the externalisation of the Union’s policies, creating linkage between the norms and 
values established within the EU and the exportation thereof towards third countries 
(Olsen, 2002:131-132). In light of the need to adequately respond to the new focus on 
regional security, the European Council published a communication reaffirming the 
strategic importance of expanding EU relations with 15 non-EU states surrounding the 
Mediterranean (Council of the European Union, 1995). giving its blessing to the 1995 
Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers in Barcelona to act as a 
founding block for renewed relations (Council of the European Union, 1995).   
2.1.1 The Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership  
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership acts as the multilateral dialogue and cooperation 
forum between the European Union and its Mediterranean partner States (IEMED, 
2015b). Its conception is the result of the 1995 conference in Barcelona, of which the 
founding State participants from the EU are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, whereas its founding 
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participants from the Mediterranean partner States are Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. Two founding participants 
concern institutions, these are the Council of the European Union and the European 
Commission (European Union, 1995:1,2).  
The Declaration served as an enabling factor that brough these 15 Member States of the 
European Union and ten Mediterranean States to the negotiating table for the purpose of 
defining the future of their relation (European Union, 1995:3), addressing soft security 
issues coming forth from a post-Cold War political landscape (Schneider, 2010:128). 
The Partnership’s general objective is to “turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of 
dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability, and prosperity 
requiring a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and 
balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion 
of greater understanding between cultures” (European Union, 1995:2). Association 
agreements between the EU and individual Mediterranean partner State form the 
bilateral dimension of the Euro-Med Partnership, with the ascription of concrete goals 
being foregone in favour of broader, general principles. Development of shared norms 
and regional integration for the purpose of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Free 
Trade Zone and an area of peace and stability form the Partnership’s multilateral 
dimension (Schneider, 2010:130). 
This conference proved itself to be the bedrock of a transformational partnership 
between the European Union and its southern neighbours, as it led to the establishment 
of EUROMED;  an intergovernmental partnership based on fostering a regional 
relationship based on cooperation in various policy areas. These areas are clustered 
under three distinct spheres, the first of which addresses the opportunities for a political 
and security partnership to foster a shared peace and stability, with a particular focus on 
the development of the rule of law and human right proliferation (European Union, 
1995:3).  The specific provisions are categorised and described in the following table: 
Develop the rule of law in the national 
political system 
Develop democracy in the national political system 
Safeguard human rights and fundamental 
freedoms 
Safeguard the diverse and pluralistic nature of our 
contemporary societies 
27 | P a g e  
 
  Table: Political- and Security-related commitments derived from the Barcelona Declaration (European Union, 1995:2,3)  
The second and the third spheres concern the economic and financial, and the social and 
cultural spheres(European Union, 1995:5-6). Aiming to improve cooperation in these 
spheres, the EU and the partner states established a work programme to facilitate the 
enaction of the objectives of the Declaration. The work programme hints at a need for 
the development of bi- and multilateral association agreements with one another to 
remove trade barriers and tariffs, ultimately seeking to create a Euro-Mediterranean 
Free Trade Area and a far-reaching cooperative spirit between the members of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership (henceforth: EMP) (European Union, 1995:8-13). More 
notably, this work plan identifies the actors upon which the agreed upon actions apply 
as “States, their local and regional authorities as well as actors of their civil society”. 
This is where the top-down nature of this agreement comes to the forefront. Though it 
binds all signatory States to the priority actions, there is no mention of a binding 
commitment being taken on by the European Union. This is in spite of the first two 
signatories to the declaration belonging to the Council and the Commission(European 
Union, 1995:1).  
In spite of the good intentions of all signatories, it soon became clear that the imbalance 
in security interests between the EMP partners led to difficulties in defining and 
realising the set policy objectives. Following a resurgence of conflicts in the Middle-
East (European Commission, 2000b:15), an inconclusive conference in Marseilles in 
2000 (European Commission, 2000a:2-3), and the shift in paradigm of the global West 
towards securitisation following the September 11 attacks in New York (Tasche, 
2010:54), the difficulties led to a failure to reach consensus on the topic of security 
reform.  
Respect sovereignty Increase cooperation in anti-terrorism initiatives 
Respect the right to self-determination Fight against expansion and diversification of 
organised crime 
Refrain from direct or indirect intervention in 
internal affairs of partner states  
Promulgate and push non-proliferation, 
disarmament and arms control initiatives 
Respect territorial integrity and unity Keep military capacity in check 
Exercise non-violent methods of dispute 
resolution 
Build confidence and good relations throughout the 
region 
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2.1.2 The Paris Declaration and the Union for the Mediterranean 
In February of 2007, on the campaign trail for his election bid to become the President 
of France, Nicolas Sarkozy proposed the establishment of a new Mediterranean Union, 
modelled after the Council of Europe, comprised of specifically the countries 
surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, and aimed at tackling concrete challenges in the 
region (Zoubir and Fernández, 2008:343). He strongly criticised the Barcelona Process, 
claiming the Union’s focus on eastern enlargement on the one hand and the focus of the 
Union on trade with its EMP partners over the other proposals had led to 
disillusionment and had resulted in a failure to achieve the set goals (Escribano and 
Lorca, 2008:2). This proposition proved to be the impetus that was necessary to 
momentarily revitalise the EMP and propel it back into relevance, culminating in the 
signing of the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean on July 13th 
2008 (European Commission, 2008). However, stark disagreements amongst EU 
Member States concerning the creation of a separate political entity outside of the EMP 
with a geological delimitation that did not include all EU Member States but did draw 
from the EU Budget (Tasche, 2010:56) ultimately led to a compromise which saw the 
grand proposal reshaped into a more comprising and less ambitious initiative (Tasche, 
2010:67).  
  2.2 the European Neighbourhood Policy 
The ENP is an instrument of EU foreign policy which operates through a combination 
of soft and hard law over a broad range of policy fields, by by uniting “norms, actors, 
and instruments within all these fields towards common objectives (van Vooren, 2012: 
73)”. Senden (2005: 81, 2004: 112) clarifies soft law as consisting of “rules of conduct 
that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force as 
such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at 
and may produce practical effects”. He goes on to claim that soft law as a concept can 
be used as an umbrella term for a wide array of instruments that lack legally binding 
force, bestowing upon it a normative status in spite of a lacking legal enforceability 
(Senden, 2005:81-82).   
Conceptualised through a framework initiative launched in December 2003 and 
launched after the European Union’s  eastward expansion of 2004, the original ENP 
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envisioned by the European Commission and the partner countries took the shape of a 
framework in which the relations between the European Union and its nearest 
neighbours could be reinforced (Commission of the European Communities, 2004). It 
was split to cover two geographical areas; the Eastern and the Southern Neighbourhood, 
the latter of which is made up of the Mediterranean countries of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Israel, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia.  
The European Union External Action Service (2016) defines the core purpose of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy as encompassing a policy that lays out the framework 
between the European Union and its Southern and Eastern partners for the purpose of 
the fostering of stabilisation, security and prosperity. It aims to do so by incentivising 
the 16 countries that neighbour the European Union’s external borders on the south and 
east by means of promises of commitment to providing support of financial and societal 
nature in exchange for the tackling of domestic political and economic reforms (Smith, 
2005:763).  
It is unsurprising that, followings its instigation, the European Neighbourhood Policy 
has been criticised for its promise for a one-size-fits-all approach within its geographical 
scope, disregarding concerns surrounding national and regional diversity and 
differentiation (Celeta and Coletti, 2015:4). It has also been criticised for its limitations 
on realising external neighbourhood Europeanisation due to the Union’s inability to 
provide attractive incentives (Gawrich et al, 2009:6). What sets it apart from the EMP is 
that the ENP offers the opportunity to formulate asymmetric relationships between the 
EU and the Partner State, which allows for a more dynamic approach compared to the 
static approach towards the development of such relationships under the EMP 
(Govantes Romero, 2018:140). 
The overall ENP infrastructure finds implementation through a series of bilateral Action 
Plans that are drawn up and agreed upon by both the EU and the individual partner state 
concerned. These Action Plans symbolise the materialisation of the commitments made 
by the partner state to share and adhere to the fundamental values of the EU. They are 
deemed to be the ‘operational tools of the legal framework represented by the 
association agreements’ (IEMED, 2015a). Subsequently, these plans establish specific 
priorities for the partner states to focus on, and the EU’s level of support for the partner 
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states depends heavily on the transposition of these priorities into practice through 
national legislation, policy enactments, and social norms (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004:13). By relying on conditionality clauses taken up in both primary 
and secondary agreements, the EU wields leverage in facilitating the exportation of 
‘shared values’ to autocratic regimes in pushing through priorly agreed-upon reforms in 
spite of regime opposition or slacking (Thépaut, 2011:4). However, the EU’s 
ineffectiveness in adapting this leverage to fit the political realities of North African 
States (Thepaut, 2011) is expected to lay bare discrepancies between the EU’s 
exportation of values, and its institutions’ valuation given to the gains and losses 
correlated and/or caused by the exportation, expressed in terms of achieving political 
interests. 
Following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010 and 2011, the ENP was revisited, and its 
focus relayed to the promotion of deep and sustainable democracy and inclusive 
economic development. Moreover, a review of the ENP showed a clear wish for deeper 
commitments on security, defined as countries’ resilience against threats they currently 
experience’ (European Commission, 2015:12). The principle unveiled by the EU for 
this purpose concerns the “more for more” principle, which adds a new dimension of 
conditionality to the commitments, allowing the Union to differentiate in its conduct 
towards the neighbouring countries based on the level of commitment and progress they 
make towards the goal of democratic reform (European Commission, 2013:1).  
The effectiveness of the ENP can be determined by looking at six factors singled out in 
a 2017 study commissioned by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the 
Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry. These six factors are represented in the table below: 
Factor    Definition   Indicators    Limitations 
Conditionality  “The EU’s ability to 
attach specific demands 
to incentives it offers to 
the neighbours.” Most 













Interests and values Two driving factors of 
EU policy that can both 
coincide and contradict 
Interests: pragmatic, 
functional 
Too high a 
dependence on 
one risks 
31 | P a g e  
 
cooperation on 















Levels of ownership 
and local dynamics 
Extent to which a policy 
is centred-towards and 
controlled by EU or 
Partner State and the 
conditions in the area 





control in hands of 
specific actor (EU 









perception of the ENP 
The extent to which the 
enaction of the ENP is 
visibly traceable and the 
way expectations and 






ENP’s effects in 
direct and less direct 
ways, level of 
symmetry between 
expectations of EU 
and of Partner State 
Interpretation of 
data on visibility 
and/or 
perception of a 
concept can be 
suggestive, 
which may lead 
to researcher 
bias.  
Influence of external 
(f)actors 
(F)actors outside of the 
EU and/or the Partner 
State’s control that affect 
the effectiveness of ENP 
goals 
Any data on non-
EU or non-Partner 
State related 
occurrences 
resulting in a 
tangible aberration 
of the expected 
effectiveness 
outcome 
The scope and 




range from the 
miniscule to the 
vast.  
Coherence “A predisposition 
towards collaborative 
and mutually reinforcing 
positions and actions of 
multiple actors” 




-Vertical (EU and 
MS) 
-Institutional 
(between and within 
institutions) 
-Multilateral 
(irrelevant for ENP 





the ENP is 
debatable. 
Table: Six factors of ENP effectiveness, their definitions, and their indicators. Source: Kostanyan 
(2017:8-10) 
 
32 | P a g e  
 
The EU actively promotes human rights, rule of law, and democracy in its foreign 
policy relations, and this is embodied in the cooperative aspects of the ENP. It does so 
through sector cooperation and providing incentives for ENP partner states in return for 
implementation of policies and standards that are aligned with those of the EU 
(European Union External Action Service, 2016). For example, the EU reciprocates 
advances in adaptation of  basic rules on equal opportunities, economic participation 
and fair competition by giving ENP partner states access to the EU’s internal market 
and financial support grants, which allows their respective economies to develop at a 
higher rate than if they were to engage in colder relations with the EU (European Union 
External Action Service, 2016).  
Having taken a look at the format of the ENP Action Plans and Progress Reports, it is 
unlikely that all the Barcelona criteria can be assessed independently. As such, I have 
divided the Barcelona Criteria identified in the second chapter into three categories 
based on the terminology used in the ENP Progress Reports. The first two categories are 
“Democracy and rule of law” and “Protecting human rights”. The third category 
purposely defined in broader terms as “Regional and international cooperation on 
justice, freedom, and security”, which captures all criteria not captured by the two 
categories that precede it. The table below shows which criteria falls under what 
category. Some criteria may fall under multiple categories, and it is not guaranteed that 
all of the criteria are included in the ENP Action Plans and/or Progress Reports. 
Democracy and rule of law Develop the rule of law in the national 
political system; 
Develop democracy in the national political 
system; 
Exercise non-violent methods of dispute 
resolution; 
Protecting human rights Protecting human rights; 
 
 
Regional and international cooperation on 
justice, freedom, and security 
Respect sovereignty; 
Respect the right to self-determination; 
Refrain from direct or indirect intervention in 
internal affairs of partner states;  
Respect territorial integrity and unity; 
Safeguard the diverse and pluralistic nature 
of our contemporary societies; 
Increase cooperation in anti-terrorism 
initiatives; 
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Fight against expansion and diversification of 
organised crime; 
Promulgate and push non-proliferation, 
disarmament and arms control initiatives; 
Keep military capacity in check 
      (Source: Table on Barcelona Criteria) 
  2.3 The Arab Spring 
A substantial external factor that needs to be taken into consideration when assessing 
the progress made by Morocco and Egypt towards realising the goals set out in the ENP 
Action Plans is the Arab Spring, which threw a wrench into the relatively calm and 
predictable nature of their respective political landscapes. It is expected that 
observations flowing out of how this event is reflected in Action Plans and Progress 
Reports will give further insight in the construction and solidity of the EU’s narrative on 
exporting values. 
The Arab Spring refers to the 2011-2012 civil uprisings in multiple Arab countries, 
which had substantial consequences in as many as 17 countries (National Staff, 2011a), 
culminating in the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya being overthrown, 
with many concessions made by affected national governments to deflect tensions, often 
starting with violent crackdowns, and resulted in a multitude of civil wars and other 
local and regional conflicts (Naar, 2013).  
The catalyst of the Arab Spring was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a 
Tunisian street vendor whom had lit himself on fire on the 17th of December 2010 
following a case of corrupt practices by the local police that resulted in his wares being 
confiscated (Lagerman, 2016). The act of this individual laid bare the deeper economic 
and social root causes of the civil uprising. Originally peaceful, the protests in the 
countries affected by the civil uprisings turned violent due to their respective 
governments’ inability to resolve the root causes through dialogue, instead opting to 
crack down on the protestors (Mushtaq and Afzal, 2017:3-7).  
The term “Arab Spring” itself is often misattributed (Haschke, 2011)(Mushtaq and 
Afzal, 2017:1) to Marc Lynch, whom wrote an interpretive article for Foreign Policy 
two days after Bouazizi set himself ablaze in which he compared the protests that had 
spread across a variety of Arab states (National Staff, 2011b) to the protests and clashes 
that occurred in the region in 2005 (Lynch, 2011). Nevertheless, the term proved 
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immensely popular, and was soon picked up by the mainstream media to refer to the 
2011 protests (Keating, 2011). Locally, it was referred to as “ثورة” or “thawra”, which is 
Arabic for ‘revolution’ (Alhassen, 2012). 
  2.4 The Kingdom of Morocco 
The Kingdom of Morocco is a country that is located in the north-western part of 
Africa, and is the home of approximately 36,8 million inhabitants. The total area of the 
country is approximately 450 thousand square kilometres. It is a country with a young 
demographic, with as much as 45% of its population aged under 25 (World Population 
Review, 2020b). The country has enjoyed consistent economic growth since 2000, with 
growth varying between a low of 1.1% in 2016 and a peak of 7.6% in 2006, as outlined 
in graph one (World Bank, 2020).  
 
         Source: The World Bank  
To better understand contemporary Morocco, it is necessary to evaluate the recent 
developments socioeconomic status of Morocco prior to 2011. Until 1999, Morocco 
was ruled by King Hassan II, whom ruled the country with an iron fist. As the then-
monarch positioned himself as an ally against the Soviets during the Cold War, the 
authoritarian nature of his rule and the human rights abuses, including but not limited to 
torture and culling of political opponents (The Economist, 2009),  were often 
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overlooked in favour of his support for Western initiatives (Haynes, 2014:131). After 
the Cold War had ended, he aptly adapted the legitimisation discourse by enacting  
seemingly democratic reforms in the second half of the last decade of the 20th century 
brought about in the spirit of the Barcelona Declaration (European Union, 1995), which 
were continued by his son and heir, King Mohammed VI, following Hassan II’s death 
in 1999. This allowed the respective monarchs to present themselves as democratisers, 
garnishing popular support and substantial loyalty of their subjects in the process 
(Haynes, 2014:131-132).  To this end, engaging in state violence as a coercion tactic 
was deemed delegitimising, which led to the Moroccan state minimising its deployment 
for the sake of keeping up the appearance that Morocco was developing itself into a 
stable democracy (Haynes, 2014:133). 
When looking at the economic progress of Morocco however, it can be undeniably 
stated that the country has made substantial advancements, with an average annual 
growth of 4.7% between 2001 and 2013 despite a recession, the 2008 economic crisis, 
and the ripple effects of the Arab Spring (Jaida, 2016:146).  
Unlike its fellow Northern African countries, the Kingdom of Morocco managed to 
steer clear of the brunt of consequences associated with the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, 
demonstrations and protests arose on the 20th of February 2011, with an estimated 
attendance of between 150 and 200 thousand protestors in 53 cities (Brouwers and 
Bartels, 2014:17). Led by the youth of the nation, popular support for, and participation 
in, the protests came from all segments of Moroccan society. Berbers, Marxists, 
socialists and Islamists walked together for the common purpose of bringing about an 
environment in which the nation would enjoy freedom, equality, real democracy, social 
justice, and dignity (Brouwers and Bartels, 2014:16). Together, they moved against the 
political authorities surrounding the monarch, whom had steered the wheel of 
Morocco’s internal policies for decades (Brouwers and Bartels, 2014:17). But unlike the 
crackdowns that had occurred in other Arab countries, state violence was shunned, and 
only employed on a handful of occasions. Interestingly, a substantial amount of the 
protesters and spokespersons on the front lines were women, whom hoped to ring in a 
new age of female emancipation (El Ouali, 2011).  
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To alleviate the concerns brought up by the February 20 Movement, King Mohammed 
VI had the government hold a national referendum on constitutional reforms which 
would see him cede the majority of executive and judiciary powers to the national 
parliament and a supreme council, effectively separating the monarchy, the executive 
body of the country, and the judiciary body of the country. However, the monarch 
retains his control over security policies and religious decisions. It furthermore codifies 
commitments to human rights, gender equality, and freedom of worship (Al Jazeera, 
2017). Despite this, the effective change from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional 
monarchy proposed through the constitutional amendments did not clearly define the 
role and the extent of power enjoyed by the king, paving the way for him to keep the 
country’s decision-making bodies on a leash (Ottaway, 2011). However, critics argue 
that the process turned out to be superficial, at least insofar that the limited political 
reforms had not fostered an environment in which Morocco’s authoritarian culture was 
phased out in favour of a more secular and less patriarchal culture (Monjib, 2011:5). 
With the rule of law remaining underdeveloped and the electoral system retaining a 
design that explicitly disadvantaged any opposition to the ruling elites, or ‘makhzen’, 
and the monarch, a strong argument can be made that Morocco’s perceived 
democratisation had, in fact, been based on deceit (Monjib: 2011:5-6).  
 
The relationship between the Union and Morocco has been contentious at times, but has 
enjoyed an overall constructive tone. Following Moroccan independence, it 
immediately started establishing deep relations with the EEC, signing a bilateral 
association treaty in 1969, subsequently followed by a broader co-operation agreement 
aimed at providing economic and financial aid through financial protocols (Haddadi, 
2002:150).  
In 1987, the Council blocked2  an attempt by Morocco to join the EEC on the basis of 
its existing economic ties with the EEC, and its commitments to liberalise its economy 
and democratise its politics (Haddadi, 2002:150). In its refusal, the Council argued that 
as Morocco is not a European State, it does not adhere to the material condition laid 
 
2 The Council rejected Morocco’s request on the ground that it is not a ‘European’ state: Council 
Decision of 1 October 1987, cited in Europe Archives, Z 207 
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down in article 237 of the Treaty of Rome (European Union, 1957:78). Nevertheless, 
the attempt did prove successful in putting EU-Moroccan relations in the limelight, with 
Jacques Delors, then-President of the Commission, visiting the country and emphasising 
the Commission’s commitment to further develop the relations between them (Haddadi, 
2002:152).  
By the year 2000, an association agreement was concluded between the European 
Union and the Kingdom of Morocco within the framework of the European-
Mediterranean Partnership that provides in the legal basis for further materialisation of 
deepening political and economic ties between the Member States of the supranational 
body and the Kingdom (European Communities, 2000). Its aim is to promote political 
dialogue, realise deeper economic and social relations, have an impact on regional 
foreign policy, and to promote cooperation (European Communities, 2000:2,3).The 
agreement also sets out to further consolidate the gradual process of Morocco’s shift 
from an authoritarian regime to a democratic nation state that respects fundamental 
human rights by cementing its development in democracy-building and human rights 
protection as essential elements of the agreement (European Communities, 2000:3), in 
effect saying that the EU’s participation is conditional on the extent to which Morocco 
adopts these values. Where Title II, III, and IV dive deeper in the details of the 
development of a free trade zone, Title V and  VI set out the parameters within which 
cooperation as defined earlier in sphere one of the Barcelona Declaration is set to be 
realised. Title V sets out the parameters for economic cooperation with the purpose of 
supporting “Morocco’s own efforts to achieve sustainable economic and social 
development” (European Communities, 2000:12). Title VI sets the parameters for 
cooperation on cooperation schemes for the improvement of social conditions 
(European Communities, 2000:16) and cultural cooperation projects (European 
Communities, 2000:17). Title VI sets the procedures for financial cooperation schemes 
and instruments (European Communities, 2000:18), whereas Title VII sets out the legal 
basis for implementing financial cooperation schemes and structures to attain the 
objectives of the agreement (European Communities, 2000:18). Title VIII consolidates 
a series of institutional, general, and final provisions. 
 Represented in the table below is the adaptation of the indicators identified in sphere 
one of the BA in the association agreement: 
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Barcelona Criteria  Association agreement       Articles 
Develop the rule of law 
in the national political 
system 
Basis for political dialogue and cooperation 
covering conditions required for peace, 
security, and regional development 
(henceforth: TI)3; basis for harmonising 
national standards with those of the EU; basis 
for cooperation to help Morocco bring its 
legal infrastructure closer to that of the EU 
Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4, art 51, 
art 52. 
Safeguard human rights 
and fundamental 
freedoms 
TI; policy progression is conditional on human 
rights protection; basis for cooperation in fields 
of migration, the role of women, family planning, 
social protection and health cover system 
improvements; 
Art 1 par 2, art 
2, art 3, art 4,  
art 69. 
Respect sovereignty TI Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4. 
Respect the right to self-
determination 
TI Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4. 
Refrain from direct or 
indirect intervention in 
internal affairs of partner 
states  
TI Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4. 
Respect territorial 
integrity and unity 
TI Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4. 
Exercise non-violent 
methods of dispute 
resolution 
TI Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4. 
Develop democracy in 
the national political 
system 
TI; basis for cooperation on education and 
training with a particular focus on access for 
women; basis for promotion of democratic values 
through cooperation between scientific 
communities,  
Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4, art 46, 
art 47. 
Safeguard the diverse 
and pluralistic nature of 
our contemporary 
societies 
TI; basis for cooperation in tourism promotion, 
basis for cultural cooperation projects and 
programmes,  
Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4, art 58, 
art 74. 
Increase cooperation in 
anti-terrorism initiatives 
TI Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4. 
Fight against expansion 
and diversification of 
organised crime 
TI; Basis for cooperation on counternarcotic 
operations 
Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4, art 62. 
Promulgate and push 
non-proliferation, 
disarmament and arms 
control initiatives 
TI Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4. 
Keep military capacity in 
check 
TI Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4. 
 
3 The reason for abbreviating this to TI is because this segment validates each indicator of the Barcelona 
Agreement. TI covers articles 1 par 2, article 3, and article 4 of Title I. 
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Build confidence and 
good relations 
throughout the region 
TI; basis for regional cooperation on all matters 
involved; basis for cross-border exchange 
programmes,  
Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4, art 45, 
art 69. 
  (source: Table BA, European Communities (2000) pg 3-4, and pg 12-18) 
What the table shows is that while not all indicators identified in sphere one of the 
Barcelona Agreement are substantiated further in the Association Agreement, it does 
show that they all fall under its scope, meaning that the Barcelona criteria are covered 
by the Association Agreement and in effect by the ENP. In particular cases, further 
guidance and emphasis is provided, providing focal points and demarcations for 
subsequent agreements that will realise the policy goals. 
Adopted on the 27th of July 2005, the bilateral EU-Morocco Action plan to implement 
the Association Agreement of 2000 sets out to define the progression of relations and 
the materialisation of the deepening of security cooperation and political, economic, 
social and cultural relations between Morocco and the EU between the European Union 
and Morocco (European Commission, 2005:1). The representatives of the two 
contracting partners set out a three-to-five year plan aimed at supporting the 
development of Morocco’s economic and social structures, as well as its legislative and 
regulatory infrastructure, to help the country align itself with the European Union, all 
the while advancing the formation of a firm basis from which to work towards 
economic integration on both the local and the regional level (European Commission, 
2005:1,2). By 2008, the European Union and Morocco concluded an agreement that 
designated the country as enjoying an advanced status in its relations with the Union, 
which singled Morocco out as the Union’s closest Mediterranean partner and acted as 
an incentive for attracting economic progress, whilst the Union finds commitments 
made by the Moroccan government to move towards adoption of European standards 
and the active promotion of its interests in the broader region (Kausch, 2010:2).  
To realise the goals set out in the action plan, the European Union set aside substantial 
funding through a variety of financial instruments, indicated in the National Indicative 
Programmes for Morocco, whilst incentivising the country to pursue internal reforms to 
make optimal use of its access to newly acquired financial assets and trade relations, as 
well as fostering regional cooperation between EU Member States and individual 
North-African states through the Union of the Mediterranean. For the period between 
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2005 and 2006, the total sum of financial support provided by the EU was €275 million 
(European Commission, 2004:6). For the period between 2007 and 2010, the total sum 
raised to €654 million (European Commission, 2007b:3). 
The Action Plan sets a series of short- and medium-term reform objectives that the EU 
and the Moroccan government had agreed upon to be priority areas for improvement, 
with developments reported annually.  Following its expiration in July 2010, the Action 
Plan continued to form the basis of the basis of the deepening of EU-Morocco ties 
within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy until its replacement by 
its successor in 2013, which was negotiated so as to better reflect the positive 
progression of relations following Morocco’s advanced status acknowledgment within 
the ENP framework (European Commission, 2013b:2).  
  2.5 The Arab Republic of Egypt 
The Arab Republic of Egypt is a country that is located in the north-eastern part of 
Africa, and extends into south-western Asia. It is home to an estimated 101 million 
inhabitants, spread over a territory of one million square kilometres. Demographically, 
the country has a firm demographic majority of ethnic Egyptians, making up 
approximately 91% of the country’s population. Much like Morocco, the vast majority 
of its population is young, with 52% of its population aged under 25 (World Population 
Review, 2020a). Since 2000, Egypt has had a volatile but consistent annual GDP 
growth, ranging from a low-point of 1.77% growth in 2011 to a peak of 7.16% growth 
in 2008, as shown in graph 2 (The World Bank, 2020b).  
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       Source: The World Bank 
Egypt’s governing system only quite recently changed to that of a republic. Up until 
1952, the ruling system of the country was monarchic, but controversies surrounding 
then-King Farouk al-Awwall’s handling of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war resulted in the 
establishment of the Free Officers Movement, led by Gamel Abdel Nassar, whom 
would later become the second President of Egypt, through a coup d’êtat in 1952 
(Allouche, 2017). Following Nassar’s death, the reins of governance befell upon 
Muhammad Anwar Al-Sadat, whom set in motion the rewriting of Egypt’s constitution, 
enshrining within it the form of governance as a ‘Socialist Democratic State based on 
the alliance of the working forces of the people’ (Egypt, 2007)4 with its political system 
based on a ‘multi-party system within the framework of the basic principles and 
components of Egyptian society’5, and declaring Islam the formal state religion and the 
Sharia its judiciary source of jurisprudence,6 with the declaration of Islam as a state 
religion constituting a shift away from his predecessor’s secular nationalism, an act that 
consolidated Sadat’s rule by garnishing the support of the Islamic groups within the 
country (Dewji, 2012).  The Constitution was later amended in 1980, resulting in Sharia 
 
4 art. 1 of the Egyptian constitution 
5 art. 5 of the Egyptian constitution 
6 art. 2 of the Egyptian constitution 
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becoming the principal source of legislation7, widenings its effective scope, and 
introducing the possibility of indefinite terms of office for the President, so long as he 
receives an absolute majority.8 Sadat was assassinated a year after the constitutional 
reform had taken place. 
For the three decades leading up to the Arab Spring, Egypt was ruled by Muhammad 
Hosni El Sayed Mubarak, whom had been elected to the position of President eight days 
after the assassination of his predecessor, Anwar Al-Sadat, in 1981 (Knell, 2013) and 
continuously reimposed a state of emergency unabatedly until his ousting which 
provided him with exceptional powers, despite having promised to lift it on multiple 
occasions (BBC News, 2012). He held the presidency of the country for five successive 
terms, stepping down in 2011 following popular uprisings against the autocratic and 
repressive regime (Hatab, 2019:28). Mubarak was keen not to change the constitution, 
claiming that refraining from amending it would foster stability (Brown and Hamzawy, 
2007:5), but nevertheless introduced a wide array of constitutional reforms in 2005 and 
2006 following increasing pressure to democratise the Egyptian political landscape and 
the steady decline of the National Democratic Party (Dunne, 2006:5).  
Egypt concluded an Association Agreement with the European Union in 2001, 
establishing an association between the EU and Egypt as per the first of June 2004 
(European Union, 2001). The agreement firmly committed both contract partners to 
consolidating the traditional links they already shared and strengthening the political, 
economic, and social development and relations(European Union, 2001:1)9, and to 
establishing a lasting partnership, with an explicit focus on the advancement of trade 
relations with one another through a variety of means, including working towards a Free 
Trade Agreement between Egypt and the bloc and financial cooperation aimed at 
modernising the country’s economy, infrastructure, and attractiveness towards investors 
(European Union, 2001:1,26)10. This prioritisation is later corroborated in the 2007-
2013 Country Strategy Paper for Egypt, where the three strategic objectives of the EU 
are identified. These are to support “Egypt’s reforms in the areas of democracy, human 
 
7 Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution 
8 Article 76 of the Egyptian constitution 
9 Preamble, article 1 par 2  
10 Preamble, article 72  
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rights, good governance and justice,” “developing the competitiveness and productivity 
of the Egyption economy,” and “ensuring the sustainability of the development process 
with effective social, economic and environmental policies and better management of 
resources” (European Commission, 2007a:22-25) 
The Association Agreement is vested in the mutual respect for democratic principles 
and internationally established fundamental human rights as a conditional factor for 
cooperation (European Communities, 2004:5)11 . It is made up of nine titles. Title I 
addressed the political dialogue, Title II, III, and IV address the establishment of a free 
trade zone between Egypt and the EU, while title V sets out the priorities concerning 
economic cooperation. Title VI addresses cooperation on social and cultural matters. 
Titles VII and VIII address financial cooperation measures that will be made available, 
and the institutional, general, and final provisions (European Communities, 2004). 
Different from the association agreement with Morocco is that the EU-Egypt 
Association Agreement is joined by a series of declarations, accompanying protocols, 
and annexes. Represented in the table below is the adaptation of the indicators identified 
in sphere one of the BA in the association agreement: 
Barcelona Criteria  Association agreement       Articles 
Develop the rule of law 
in the national political 
system 
Basis for political dialogue and cooperation 
in subjects of common interests, particularly 
peace, security, democracy, and regional 
development (henceforth: TII)12 
Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4 
Safeguard human rights 
and fundamental 
freedoms 
TII; development of relationship dependent on 
respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; prioritisation of cooperation in fields 
of migration, the role of women, family planning 
and child, social, and healthcare services, as well 
as poverty and knowledge and experience 
exchanges. 
Art 1 par 2, art. 
2, art 3, art 4, 
art 65 
Respect sovereignty TII;  Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4 
Respect the right to self-
determination 
TII; Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4 
Refrain from direct or 
indirect intervention in 
internal affairs of partner 
states  
TII; Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4 
 
11 Article 2 
12 The reason for abbreviating this to TII is because this segment validates each indicator of the 
Barcelona Agreement. TII covers articles 1 par 2, article 3, and article 4 of Title I. 
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Respect territorial 
integrity and unity 
TII; Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4 
Exercise non-violent 
methods of dispute 
resolution 
TII; Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4 
Develop democracy in 
the national political 
system 
TII; development of education and training with a 
particular focus on access for women; promotion 
of democratic values through cooperation 
between scientific communities, 
Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4, art. 42, 
art. 43  
Safeguard the diverse 
and pluralistic nature of 
our contemporary 
societies 
TII; development of tourism and cultural 
cooperation dialogue, projects, and programmes 
Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4, art 54, 
art 71 
Increase cooperation in 
anti-terrorism initiatives 
TII; develop information and experience 
exchanges, pursue joint research and studies; 
counterterror efforts fall under political dialogue 
and cooperation 
Art 1 par 2, art 




Fight against expansion 
and diversification of 
organised crime 
TII; cooperate on countering money-laundering; 
develop effectiveness of counternarcotic 
operations;  
Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4, art 57, 
art 58 
Promulgate and push 
non-proliferation, 
disarmament and arms 
control initiatives 
TII;  Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4 
Keep military capacity in 
check 
TI Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4. 
Build confidence and 
good relations 
throughout the region 
TI; development of regional cooperation; basis 
for exchange programmes for information, 
experts, and students,  
Art 1 par 2, art 
3, art 4, art 60, 
art 61, art 69. 
  (source: Table BA, European Communities (2001) 
Like it was the case with Morocco, all BA indicators fall under the scope of the EU-
Egypt Association Agreement. This means that there is a concrete legal basis upon 
which these indicators rest for their implementation through the ENP Action Plans. 
Interestingly, this Association Agreement was markedly more voluminous than its 
counterpart due to the inclusion of Annexes, Declarations, and Protocols, which provide 
further interpretation.  
The first bilateral EU-Egypt Action plan to implement the Association Agreement that 
entered into force on the first of June 2004 was adopted in March 2007, and covered a 
three-to-five-year period. It set out to reaffirm the mutual commitment towards 
deepening of political, economic and social relations between the respective contract 
partners, and to transforming a mutually beneficial strategical partnership into a 
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mutually empowering relationship that will promote peace, stability, security, growth, 
development, and prosperity externally, while modernising Egypt’s economy and 
society internally (European Commission, 2007c:1). 
It aimed to do so by setting “ambitious objectives based on joint ownership, common 
interests, reciprocal commitments, differentiation, shared values and implementation of 
national plans and reform programmes, politically, economically, socially and 
institutionally” (European Commission, 2007c:1). These ambitious objectives 
concerned advancements in a variety of areas, most notably the modernisation of 
Egyptian society and economy, and security-building in the region through the 
allocation of suitable means of financial support (European Commission, 2007c:1,2) 
This is visibly represented in the Action Plan’s set of priorities, where two foremost 
priorities are directly related to security, and the third up and until the tenth priority are 
directly related to democracy-building and strengthening Egypt’s economic prowess 
(European Commission, 2007c:3,4). In the area of securitisation, priority is laid on the 
enhancement of political dialogue and cooperation based on international law and 
agreements with the aim to find a resolution to the conflict in the Middle East 
(European Commission, 2007c:3)13. Further priority is then laid on broader security 
issues related to weaponry access including disarmament and non-proliferation topics, 
as well as supporting anti-terrorism initiatives and peacekeeping(European 
Commission, 2007c:3).14 The third and fourth priorities outlined in the Action Plan 
relate to democracy-building (European Commission, 2007c:3)15 and the safeguarding 
of fundamental human rights (European Commission, 2007c::4)16. The six priorities that 
follow are all related to a range of trade agreements and strengthening Egypt’s 
economy, starting with liberalisation of areas of trade such as trade in services and in 
agriculture with the purpose of fostering economic integration with the EU (European 
Commission, 2007c:4)17, attracting foreign investments with the purpose of alleviating 
poverty and creating jobs by improving macroeconomic governance through reforms to 
 
13 Priority 1 
14 Priority 2 
15 Priority 3 
16 Priority 4 
17 Priority 5 
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the financial sector EU (European Commission, 2007c:4)18, supporting developments in 
industrial and enterprising capabilities, as well as competitiveness EU (European 
Commission, 2007c:4)19, harmonise national legislation to standards applied by the EU 
by co-identifying areas that are suitable for this through dialogue EU (European 
Commission, 2007c:4)20, continue reforming the tax system, public institutions and the 
management of public funds take place EU (European Commission, 2007c:4)21, and 
finally promote trade between developing countries and regional development(European 
Commission, 2007c:4)22. The remainder of set priorities focus on various forms of 
improvements in cooperation between the EU and Egypt, covering a wide array of 
policy sectors and harmonisation efforts, including but not limited to the cooperation in 
the education and healthcare sector EU (European Commission, 2007c:4)23, the IT, 
R&D and communication sectors EU (European Commission, 2007c:4)24, the migration 
and organised crime sectors EU (European Commission, 2007c:5)25, the transport, 
energy and environmental sectors (European Commission, 2007c:5)26, and finally 
personal and civil society development (European Commission, 2007c:5)27.  
Notable here is that the priorities are firmly centred around sectors that are of strategic 
importance to the European Union, with the emphasis on values-based improvements, 
though present throughout, not coming into play strongly until the 11th priority. This 
relatively low prioritisation is more visible in the allocation expectations of EU support 
funds. 
To realise the goals set out in the Action Plan, the EU provides funding through a series 
of financial instruments, indicated in the National Indicative Programmes for Egypt. For 
the period between 2007 and 2011, the total budget comes down to €558. Of this, 7% is 
allocated towards value-based reforms, 40% is allocated towards economic 
development, and another 53% towards sustainability development (European 
 
18 Priority 6 
19 Priority 7 
20 Priority 8 
21 Priority 9 
22 Priority 10 
23 Priority 11 
24 Priorities 12, 13 
25 Priorities 14, 15 
26 Priorities 16, 17, 18 
27 Priority 19 
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Commission, 2007b:38). This is €449 million for the period between 2011 and 2013, 
with the allocation rate divided into 11%, 42%, and 47% respectively (European 
Commission, 2010:30).  
The Action Plan sets several short- and medium-term reform objectives that the EU and 
the Egyptian government have agreed to prioritise, with progress being reported 
annually. Following its expiration in 2013, the Action Plan was replaced in 2017 
(Association Council, 2017).  
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3. Methods and data collection 
  3.1 Methodology 
To test the hypotheses constructed in the introduction chapter above, this thesis paper 
provides a comparative case study analysis developed by consulting official EU 
documents and statements put out by the European Council and Commission, scholarly 
articles, and external reports that shed further light on arguments made. The research 
question will be assessed through the lens of two opposing international relations 
theories, namely constructivism and realism. The analytical framework employed for 
this thesis concerns that of Europeanisation, conceptualised and operationalised within 
the specific context of Neighbourhood Europeanisation. 
By executing this analysis, the EU’s narrative towards the ENP will be put into 
perspective, laying besides one another the Europeanisation efforts by the Moroccan 
and Egyptian governments for the purpose of making a comparative case analysis of 
reforms passed by the respective countries vis-à-vis the level of compliance with the 
reforms laid out in the ENP Action Plans. By doing this, I will create a working 
framework from which to evaluate whether the narrative reflected by the EU is values- 
or interest-based. The findings will serve as indicators in discerning whether there are 
discrepancies between the narrative put forward by the European Union, and the 
materialisation thereof into Europeanisation. 
The main reason for pursuing the research question by means of a process-tracing based 
comparative case study is because such studies lend themselves well to examining the 
effects of policy change, and, by extension, the positions and behaviour of the actors 
involved in realising policy change, over a specific timespan. The policy under 
examination flows out of series of agreements on reforms in return for political and 
economic incentives between the European Union and the sovereign States bordering 
the Mediterranean Sea, so by analysing a minimum of two cases, the reliability of the 
research outcome is heightened. It also contributes to the academic field of 
Europeanisation and ENP policy impact research by proving the replicability of the 
working framework over the course of the first two chapters, opening windows for 
further research by applying – and possibly, if necessary, adapting – the model to 
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further case studies, widening the spectrum of knowledge on the impact of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in both the EU and abroad. 
The case studies take place by first outlining the variables through which to measure the 
extent to which the EU’s narrative reflects a more values- or interest-based approach 
towards its relations with its southern ENP Partner States by establishing the 
components of the analytical framework and by providing a background of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Morocco, and Egypt. This is done in Chapter two. 
Next, the narrative of the progress from the perspective of the EU is constructed by 
analysing the contents of the annually published ENP Progress Reports that reflect the 
way in which the EU interacts with Morocco and Egypt within the framework of the 
ENP. 
For each case study, key policy fields are identified as variables through their 
connection to the theory. The units of observation are the rates of policy adaptation and 
convergence over time, set off against the supranational projection. The empirical 
primary sources of information are the ENP Action plans and accompanying Progress 
Reports associated with the countries under examination. This study will also rely on 
scholarly assessments of the ENP in more general terms as a theoretical secondary 
source, insofar this fits within the scope of the researched topic. 
The material is approached from a qualitative perspective, using process tracing to 
establish a causal link between the independent and dependent variables of the research 
question. As this thesis will address the external adoption of EU standards, the main 
focus will be on the Neighbourhood Europeanisation phenomenon of the exportation of 
political organisation and governance (Olsen, 2002:924) to the respective nation states 
of Morocco and Egypt in exchange for favourable trade, developmental and diplomatic 
relations. This formulation narrows down the approach to top-down Europeanisation, 
with the emphasis on the Partner States downloading EU norms and values into their 
own governance structures.  
An important challenge in answering this research question is dependent upon exploring 
the effects of changing the dimensions of the independent variable to examine how this 
affects the dependent variable. In this question, the  independent variable concerns the 
level of adherence to the ENP goals set through the Association Agreement and 
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subsequent ENP Action Plans. The dependent variable is the narrative, reflected by the 
concrete results presented through first and foremost the ENP Progress Reports, but also 
through the changes made to the interpretation of the goals set in the Association 
Agreement as made visible through the ENP Action Plans. The effect of the 
independent variable on the narrative can be measured by altering the conditions under 
which the independent variable interacts with its dependent counterpart. The 
expectation is that changes in the fulfilment and interpretation of the goals set out in the 
ENP will find reflection in the narrative put out by the EU, and that this will provide 
insights into whether its approach is values- or interests-based. This should be 
particularly visible following the addition of the ‘more for more’ principle in 2011, as 
the divergence in approaches caused by the impact of the differentiation this brings is 
expected to leave visible marks. 
The formulation of the central research question allows for exploration of the grey area 
between the respective approaches, providing the opportunity for a deeper level of 
analysis in which nuances are not disregarded. The link between theory and the 
empirical data is established by means of a clear, coherent, and consistent analysis of 
the indicators identified. Conceptualisation and operationalisation of the working 
framework through which the central research question is approached take place in 
Chapter two.  
The research question is approached from the perspective of one of the core indicators 
of the ENP’s effectiveness, namely the mutual level of adherence to the conditionality 
clauses, exemplified through the use of preconditions, incentives and other instruments. 
The reason for choosing this indicator is because looking at how conditionality affects 
the enactment of the ENP is expected to shed light on how the EU handles situations 
where the interests of the Partner State and the EU are not necessarily aligned, and 
whether this misalignment leads to the EU changing its position on the continuation of 
norm diffusion.  
The way in which the effects of the ENP are measured is through a series of annually 
published progress reports, which gauge the extent to which the Partner State in 
question adheres to its ENP Action Plan. For this thesis, the working framework 
developed in chapters one and two is applied on the respective case studies of Morocco 
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and Egypt, with a timespan delineation ranging from 2007 to 2013. This delineation will 
be further divided up by an additional timespan delineation at 2011, the year where the 
more for more principle was reinforced, with the study differentiating between the pre-
2011 and post-2011 developments. It is expected that changes in the observable 
trajectory of the policy adaptation and convergence rates constitute indications of the 
presence of one or both of the two types of narrative under examination. If the 
observable trajectory does not change or is otherwise minimally affected the principle, 
then conclusions flow forth from the consistency of the progression.  
For the objective of providing an accurate answer to the research question posed, the 
following five factors are highlighted. First, it is necessary to establish indicators that 
can be used to follow the process of Europeanisation. For this purpose, the priorities for 
the Union as laid out in the Barcelona Declaration that promote the EU’s foreign policy 
objectives outlined in article 21:2 TEU are identified. These priorities are then 
compared to their respective counterparts in the 2000 EU-Morocco Association 
Agreement and the 2001 EU-Egypt Association Agreement, which form the legal basis 
for closer bilateral relations between the EU and the two countries within the framework 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The concretisation of the Barcelona priorities in 
the Association Agreement set the base line of expectations from which to examine the 
respective case studies. 
Next, relying on ENP Progress Reports, the level of development of the chosen 
indicators in the Partner States under examination will be mapped out. By adding the 
correlating financial commitments made by the EU contained in the ENPI, a clearer 
picture of the way in which the EU puts its money where its mouth is can be presented. 
Together, the indicators and their corresponding financial commitments as made by the 
EU constitute a dataset compiled of dry data: steps undertaken in policy fields, and 
finance allocation information.  
Armed with this dataset, the succeeding step is to give interpretation to the EU’s actions 
and establish the narrative by looking at the Council’s and the Commission’s actions 
with regards to the neighbourhood, and more specifically by taking into account their 
adopted and taken provisions when it comes to Morocco and Egypt.  
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These actions are examined from a constructivist and a realist perspective, and put on a 
double time-line that will show how the countries behave over the ten-year period on 
the one hand, and the EU’s reaction to the behaviour as shown by the accumulation of 
the Council’s and the Commission’s actions. Though focusing specifically on the ENP, 
secondary findings are expected to show influence of external factors on the findings.  
By comparing the highlighted factors with their counterparts from the other case study, 
this thesis disseminates the narratives put forward by the European Union towards these 
two Southern ENP partner states, discern whether the ‘more-for-more’ principle is 
applied equally, explore the possibility that there could be a discrepancy between the 
narrative and the materialisation thereof, and, if so, elaborate on the reasons for this 
discrepancy.  
The reasoning behind the selection of the cases is as follows. The countries of Morocco 
and Egypt have both shown sustained openness towards deepening their levels of 
regional integration with the European Union, and have both taken measures to work 
towards compliance with the priorities agreed upon in the Barcelona Declaration. 
However, following the Arab Revolution, the two countries diverged in terms of 
trajectory of political development. It is expected that this divergence in political 
development affects the trajectory of Europeanisation, and in effect the way in which 
the EU positions itself towards the Partner State in question. This allows for 
comparisons to be drawn over two distinguishable periods of time, with the line drawn 
in the year in which the Arab Spring picked up pace and the ‘more for more’ principle 
was introduced.  
3.2 Collection of data 
The data is gathered using directed qualitative content analysis, which is an approach 
that serves the purpose of “validating or extending conceptually a theoretical framework 
or theory” by providing “predictions about the variables of interest or about the 
relationships among variables, helping to determine the initial coding scheme or 
relationships between codes” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005:1281).  
It  primarily takes place through weighing the European Commission’s ENP Progress 
Reports up against the baseline indicators comprised of the priorities contained in the  
Barcelona Declaration and the country-specific Association Agreements. Further 
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primary sources include agreements between the EU and the partner states studied, and 
other reports commissioned by the European Commission within the framework of 
facilitating the deepening of political and economic integration with the EU’s Southern 
ENP partner states. Where academic literature is consulted, care is taken to ensure the 
quality of the content.  
3.3 Putting together the working research design framework  
The working framework is constructed out of three layers, altogether forming an 
equation which makes it possible to give an answer to the research question. The 
outermost layer represents the umbrella framework of neighbourhood Europeanisation, 
which forms the broad basis. The middle layer represents the rate of adaptation and 
policy convergence, which can be measured by examining the extent to which the 
Partner State implements measures that flow out of the bilateral Association 
Agreements and Action Plans they have signed with the EU, and the rate of 
supranational projection, which is measured by looking at the impact of the EU’s values 
and/or interests on policy change in its Partner States. The inner layer represents the rate 
of identity construction, which is determined by the emergence of shared norms, values, 
and interests between the EU and the Partner State28. The variables of the equation are 
then given values by creating an accurate chronologic depiction of the observations 
made by the European Commission in the rates of adaptation and policy convergence, 
which open the door for assessing the impact of the adaptation and policy convergence 
on the reconstruction of elements of the Partner States’ identity. This impact assessment 
can then be addressed from the perspectives of the diffusion of normative values on the 
one hand, and the defending or promoting of structural interests on the other. Building 
on the first and second chapter, the flow chart below illustrates the body of the working 
framework.  
 
28 See: Chapter 1.1.2, Table Wang,  





This thesis has some limitations that need to be taken into account. First of all, it is 
important to note that employing Europeanisation as an analytical framework is only 
possible when the ongoing process of European integration is assumed to be present, a 
preconception which may lead to researcher bias by ascribing elements of policy change 
as being reflective of this integratory process whilst this does not necessarily have to be 
the case. In addition to this, it is unclear how the actors responsible for mapping the 
progress of the ENP Action Plans draw some of their conclusions, and the format and 
content of the Progress Reports is not consistent throughout, particularly in case of the 
reports related to Egypt. This brings to light another limitation which may influence the 
manner in which observations are portrayed, namely that the dependence on not fully 
consistent documentation from the EU as main source material can result in the drawing 
of conclusions on a one-sided or biased basis, as the national perspective does not 
present itself as clearly as that of the EU and its institutions.  This concern is partially 
mitigated by working on the assumption that the presentation of the data gathered by the 
European Commission and other institutions is factual, but that does not mitigate the 
concern of inadequate, lacking, or otherwise incomplete information colouring either 
the datasets themselves or the interpretation thereof. 
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As a safeguard against research bias, I clearly stipulate where a lack of information 
inhibits me from drawing conclusions from observations. By being transparent about 
the way I interpret the data available to me and by presenting a clear and replicable 
methodology, I expect to be able to consistently substantiate all claims put forward 
throughout the thesis. 
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4. Case studies 
The first two chapters set out to establish the elements necessary to construct the body 
of the working framework within which to approach the research question. In this 
chapter, the working framework is applied on the respective case studies of the 
development of EU-Moroccan and EU-Egyptian relations, as reported upon through the 
lens of the respective countries’ progression in realising ENP goals. Following this, 
differences and similarities between the respective cases will be discussed, from which 
a conclusion will be drawn in chapter five 
4.1 Morocco 
This case study examines the extent to which the Barcelona converge with the concrete 
measures flowing out of the EU-Morocco ENP Action Plan and logged by the ENP 
Progress Reports. The first part looks at the extent to which adaptation of the measures 
in the three categories under examination converge with the adaptation of the Action 
Plan in the period of 2007 until and including 2010, whilst the second part looks at this 
for the period from 2011 until and including 2013. 
4.1.1 Policy Adaptation and Convergence 2007-2010 
4.1.1.1 Democracy and the rule of law 
In the areas of democracy and the rule of law, the Action Plan laid particular emphasis 
on the consolidation of the administrative bodies that are responsible for the 
reinforcement of respect for democracy and the rule of law, and cooperation in tackling 
corruption, but also on the reformation of the justice system (European Commission, 
2005:4,5).   
The first progress report examined noted that Morocco is experiencing positive 
developments in the areas of democracy and the rule of law, specifically in the 
consolidation of the administrative bodies required to improve its democratic practices 
and adherence to the rule of law. The year saw the country’s first national election take 
place with both domestic and international observers present to monitor its proceedings, 
although the legal framework to accommodate this had yet to be established. 
Nevertheless, the overhaul of the country’s electoral legislation remained ongoing. 
Decentralisation of its political landscape continued with the establishment of the High 
Authority for Audio-visual Communication, an institution which regulates the speaking 
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time for political parties on public broadcasting channels, and its accession to the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law. New laws were drafted and passed 
establishing a judicial body capable of trying government members, and an advisory 
council on matters pertaining to draft legislative and regulatory texts was brought into 
existence.  
In spite of this, the report did stipulate severe shortcomings concerning the lack of a 
clearly defined strategy behind decentralisation processes being undertaken, the 
perceived credibility of Moroccan parties and its parliament following an election which 
was troubled by a considerable amount of invalid votes and abstentions, and an overall 
lack of clarity on the reassembled roles of elected officials. Furthermore, on the topic of 
combating corruption, although a Central Corruption Prevention Authority has been 
established, legislation aimed at stipulating asset declaration conditions for holders of 
public offices has been drafted, public procurement legislation has been adopted, and a 
national corruption and transparency development observatory has been set up, the 
report remains highly critical of the continuing prevalence of corruption in many sectors 
of Moroccan economy and among its population, noting that substantial behavioural 
change in this regard is required for progress to be made (MPR 2007:3) 
Meanwhile, Justice reforms in 2007 largely focused on the simplification of judicial 
procedures and the improvement of accessibility. Though the report indicates 
advancements in arbitration, mediation, and ad hoc preparations for further accessibility 
improvements, the report discerns that the level of persistence of systemic dysfunctions 
in the judicial framework continue to result in  an inability to guarantee citizen right 
protections. This is especially prevalent in the country’s prison system, where 
modernisation through construction and development of facilities and through 
accelerated training and literacy programmes has yet to offset observations of ill-
treatment and worse taking place inside the prisons (MPR 2007:3). The concrete 
progress in democratic and human right reform continued over the course of 2008, 
though a lack of reform of the justice system threatens the undertaking of developing a 
justice system capable of upholding the rule of law, providing the population with 
protection, and incentivising businesses (MPR 2008:2). The report continues to 
elaborate on the developments in democratic reforms, remarking that the national 
government has taken measures to improve the conditions of local governance by 
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adopting a new communal chapter to that effect, a new electoral code that empowers 
citizen participation in politics, and a simplification and decentralisation of control over 
the organisation of local authorities’ finances. In particular, female empowerment is 
encouraged. However, progress has yet to be made in the area of independent election 
monitoring (MPR 2008:3). The 2008 report also delivered harsh criticism on the lack of 
progress in the development of the rule of law in relation to justice reform. Prison 
reform is happening too slowly, with the juvenile penal system reform seeing it 
retaining its overcomplex form and harshening sentences in spite of providing more 
legal protection (MPR 2008:3,4). In fighting back corruption, minimal reforms were 
implemented. This resulted in the country backsliding on the corruption perception 
index (MPR 2008:4). By 2009, the new electoral code led to more female 
representatives being elected into office, and working groups are established to 
formulate reforms of the judiciary aimed at making it more independent and 
accountable. Further legislation to combat corruption has also been enacted, though 
Morocco continues to regress on the corruption perception surveys. To this end, 
Morocco has set up a corruption prevention unit and an anti-corruption legal assistance 
centre (MPR 2009:4). The reformation initiatives found further realisation over the 
course of 2010, with the Moroccan government presenting 23 draft laws aimed at 
revising the justice system in accordance with the EU’s expectations. To this end, the 
EU has vouched financial support as increases to the Justice budget are necessary to 
implement all proposed changes, particularly with regards to expanding the anti-
corruption initiatives (MPR 2010:4). In addition to this, a regionalisation commission 
has been brought into life with the purpose of examining how to best harmonise 
regional with national governance inside the country’s territorial borders (MPR 2010:5). 
4.1.1.2 Protecting human rights 
In the area of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, the commitment 
reached in the ENP Action Plan concerned four fields, ranging from individual human 
rights protection to political assembly and labour rights. Here, the Moroccan 
government committed itself to working towards adherence to the international 
standards of human rights and fundamental freedom protection by reviewing its opt-outs 
to international conventions on human rights-related topics, pursuing legislative reforms 
that would consolidate human rights protection, evaluating the feasibility of acceding to 
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optional protocols to international human rights conventions in this regard, fostering 
dialogue on this topic, promoting the cultural and linguistic rights covering the full 
scope of inhabitants of Morocco, and pursuing the furtherance of criminal law reforms. 
Specific emphasis was placed on the promotion and protection of the rights of women 
and children, in particular regarding the combating of discrimination and violence 
against women and the promotion of their role in social and economic progress, and the 
assimilation of the rights contained in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
into national law. Morocco also aimed to implement fundamental social rights and core 
labour standards, and enhance the legal protection provided to pregnant women in the 
workplace (European Commission, 2005:5,6). In regard to freedoms of association and 
expression, Morocco committed to revamping its law on freedom of association and of 
assembly, bringing it in line with the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, developing the Press Code, and supporting legislative reforms that would 
liberalise the audio-visual sector. 
The 2007 Progress report clarifies the ongoing pursuance of objectives concerning the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as making steady process. In its 
quest to adhere to international standards, Morocco has signed onto a slew of 
international agreements that stipulate the conditions to which states that respect human 
rights are bound, and engaged proactively in its dialogue with the Union under the 
framework of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratisation, and Governance, 
and has started considering abolition of the death penalty (MPR 2007:4). In their efforts 
to strengthen cooperation on human rights, the European Community has provided 
financial and technical support in developing a national strategy and action plan aimed 
at democracy-building and human rights adherence. However, concrete 
recommendations concerning judicial reform, constitutional revision and adoption of 
international conventions and associated protocols made by the Equity and 
Reconciliation Commission have yet find implementation. A likewise issue arises when 
looking at developments in representation right equalisation, with liberalisation of the 
audio-visual sector and the registration of non-governmental organisations that may run 
contrary to perceived state interests still lacks consistent and fair application of the law, 
and when assessing police violence cases that took place during the year (MPR 2007:5).  
 
60 | P a g e  
 
It also put limited effort in campaigns and infrastructure-building aimed at developing 
the rights of women in the country. They have made efforts to expand on female 
representation in the new government, amended the Nationality Code so mothers can 
pass on the Moroccan nationality to their offspring, regardless of the father’s 
nationality, and drafted a legal act that would provide women with more protection 
against violence, all the while preparing to set up a national observatory against 
domestic violence. Nevertheless, materialisation of all of these efforts have lacked 
behind. Morocco still hasn’t withdrawn its reservations to CEDAW, nor has it 
adequately improved the capacity of its family courts for them to handle the increase in 
reports of violations flowing from the clearer delineations thereof (MPR 2007:5).  
In the 2008 report, the rapporteur raises a substantial amount of concerns regarding the 
lack of concrete progress in the furtherance of human rights protections. Though the 
kingdom has expressed formal intent to bind itself to international conventions on 
human rights, this intent has yet to materialise into accession to or withdrawal of 
reservations from international conventions. It also has yet to further safeguard the 
separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. Here, the rapporteur states 
that the general applicability of the primacy of international conventions in national case 
law is a concrete goal of the agreement (MPR 2008:4). This lack of progress is also 
brought forward by the rapporteur when he looks at the prison reform developments, 
stating that “prison conditions have not improved, particularly with regard to arbitrary 
violence, detention of minors in adult facilities and insignificant training and integration 
programmes” (MPR 2008:5). A national debate is stalling abolition of the death penalty, 
and the reorganisation of the prison administration will not find concrete output until 
2009. Adding to this, proposed and enacted reforms of the freedom of press and 
assembly continue to fall short of promises made, with censorious laws preserved in the 
new draft Press Code and accessibility to legal rights for organisations continuing to be 
thwarted when this serves state interests (MPR 2008:5). Awareness raising events 
aimed at combating violence against women continue, but the absence of affirmative 
action when it comes to policy adoption has continued to leave women and children 
subject to undue harm. Child marriages labour remain abundant. Although the 
awareness campaigns appear successful in changing the mentality towards such issues, 
insufficient resources are being invested to provide the necessary tools and expertise for 
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the system itself to change along with it (MPR 2008:5) This lack of ratification of 
international conventions and accession to the ICCPR protocols continued throughout 
2009, and national policy proposals to safeguard individual freedoms have yet to find 
their way into legislation. The discussion on the death penalty is still ongoing at this 
point, though it is currently not being carried out. Furthermore, though substantial 
progress has been made by Morocco in securing cultural and linguistic rights, this 
progress does not seem to extend towards the right to demonstrate or otherwise 
congregate in public, nor does it provide fundamental rights to marginalised societies in 
the Sahara (MPR 2009:5). When looking at the securing of female and child rights in 
Morocco, the prospects seem peachy but the practice seems bleak. Political 
commitments are not transposed into policy, and a legislative act against gender-based 
violence, as well as adaptations to the Family Code and Labour Code, are yet to be 
implemented effectively (MPR 2009:6). Morocco’s inability to accede to protocols and 
ratify international human rights treaties continues through 2010 (MPR 2010:5), as does 
its reluctancy to implement recommendations aimed at reducing discrimination, 
providing security for displaced people (MPR 2010:6), and ensuring that Moroccan 
citizens have access to freedom of expression, demonstration, and that of 
association(MPR 2010:5,6). Though the Moroccan government has made many 
commitments in these areas, very little of this has materialised, as can be seen by the 
outbreak of violence in a West-Saharan protest camp, and the disproportionate actions 
taken by the Moroccan authorities in this and other cases (MPR 2010:6). In contrast to 
this, Morocco is progressing in its devolvement of its hard hand in cases related to 
cultural and linguistic rights, having successfully launched a Amazigh language TV 
channel, and some headway is being made in safeguarding female and family rights, 
though implementation of these safeguards is challenging, as they override local 
preconceptions and traditions, as well as require substantial revision of the national 
legislative acts associated with these topics (MPR 2010:6,7). 
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4.1.1.3 Regional and international cooperation on justice, freedom, and security 
In the areas of regional and international cooperation and security, the Action Plan lays 
out four key priorities to be pursued, three of which will be examined below. These are 
to enhance political dialogue and cooperation when common interests are at stake, 
develop cooperative means of handling issues, conflicts and crises,  counterterrorism 
cooperation, and non-proliferation and anti-illegal arms export cooperation (European 
Commission, 2005:7,8). The additional priority of cooperation on justice and home 
affairs, covering the areas of migration and organised crime (European Commission, 
2005:20-26), are also included in this assessment and joined together with the second 
and third priority, replacing the fourth priority. 
The first priority concerns the enhancement of political dialogue and cooperation to 
secure common interests. The first progress report examined looks at the situation in 
2007, and found that Morocco had gained ground its commitments towards regional 
security by means of Morocco’s accession to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism at the ending of the previous year, its principled decision to support  the 
Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy declarations on a case-by-case basis, its 
commitment to exert control over the dual-use appliance export regimes, and its wish 
for closer European Security and Defence Policy cooperation following the country’s 
highly successful participation in the ALTEA operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(MPR 2007:6).  This upward trend continued over the course of 2008, with Morocco 
wishing to expand the multilateral enhanced political dialogue forum to include a wider 
range of subjects of common interests. This flowed out of the sharing of political views 
in the Association Council a few months prior. The rapporteur made notice of 
Morocco’s proactive approach in reaching out to the necessary stakeholders for a 
deepening of mutual commitments on cooperative efforts. The country took part in a 
European crisis management exercise, furthered its cooperation in the area of 
controlling dual-use items, and expanded its counterterror and intelligence-sharing 
initiatives. The rapporteur does note that ratification of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court has yet to occur at this point in time (MPR 2008:6).  
In the area of regional cooperation and initiatives, foreign ministers of ten 
Mediterranean countries including Morocco met on multiple occasions to discuss 
deeper levels of cooperation on security issues, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the AMU 
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and other topics. The rapporteur notes that political obstacles keep the AMU from 
becoming an effective player in the region, emphasising disagreements on technical 
issues and non-tariff barriers (MPR 2008:6). This trend is also visible in the 2009 
report, which shows a consistent continuation of political dialogue and cooperative 
efforts in the fields of foreign and security relations, conflict prevention, and crisis 
management, with the rapporteur noting that efforts expended by the Moroccan 
government in the varying formal and informal meetings having brought about a 
strengthening of concertation and cooperation mechanisms between Morocco and its 
partners, both in the European Union, the 5+5 dialogue partners, and, to a more modest 
extent, the Arab Maghreb Union. Furthermore, the country is carving out a reputation 
for itself as the Union’s main partner in Africa for the purpose of the promotion of 
democratic governance and human rights protection, all the while consolidating its role 
in  regional cooperative initiatives in areas such as counterterrorism and combating 
organised crime. In spite of this, by 2009, Morocco has yet to move forward with the 
ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC (MPR 2009:6,7). The 2010 report notes the 
intensification of cooperation between the EU and Morocco in the UNHRC and in 
promoting democratic governance and human right protection in Africa, though it still 
has yet to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC. It also notes the distinct wish of the 
Moroccan government to cooperate with the EU on its regional counterterrorism 
strategy for Sahel, and that the negotiations between Morocco and the Council 
concerning cooperation with Europol has resulted in a draft agreement that has since 
been approved by Morocco. Regional cooperation within the AMU has shown minor 
signs of improvement, with commitments to an inter-Maghreb Free Trade Area coming 
to fruition despite being undercut by continuing political obstacles, and the continuation 
of the dialogues in the 5+5 format (MPR 2010:7). The year 2010 has also brought about 
the adoption of a decree outlining the residency permit issuance and withdrawal 
conditions for foreigners. The rapporteur emphasises that this adopted decree is in line 
with EU principles and approaches. The rapporteur furthermore notes the continued 
close and productive cooperation between Morocco and Spain, as well as the 
continuation of information exchanges, but also of the unrelenting lack of progress in 
negotiating an EU-Morocco readmission agreement (MPR 2010:15). 
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The second priority concerns the development of cooperative means of handling issues, 
conflicts and crisis. Here, the first progress report makes note of a territorial dispute 
with Front Polisario over the Western Sahara, where dispute settlement negotiations 
undertaken under the wing of the United Nations has resulted in early concessions on 
decentralisation of the region, with the proposal put forward by Morocco showing 
willingness to provide major political, economic and social autonomy to the region, 
under the condition that it submits itself to Moroccan sovereignty (MPR 2007:6,7). It 
also notes a major challenge with regards to migration. Looking at developments related 
to this topic, limited progress has been made. Transposition of legal acts providing real 
protections to refugees have not materialised despite signing an agreement with the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (henceforth: UNCHR) to this end. 
The establishment of a refugee status determination procedure is identified as a key 
priority to end the deadlock. In the extension of this, the UNHCR and the Moroccan 
Organisation for Human Rights are working on the development of a assistance centre 
for refugees and asylum seekers. This assistance centre is set to become an important 
provider of information and guidance for refugee status applicants. Furthermore, 
negotiations on the readmission agreement have continued to be ineffective, with little 
to no progress having been made over the course of the year (MPR 2007:14,15). When 
looking at legal migration, some tangible progress has been reported. Legal migration 
rates from Morocco to the EU raising following information exchanges and campaigns 
within the EC-funded institutional support project for the movement of people, whilst 
the Directorate of Migration and Border Surveillance has been empowered through 
higher resource allocation and better cross-institutional coordination, realised in part 
thanks to financial assistance from Union partners. This has led to a notable drop in 
irregular entries into the EU by individuals traveling from or through Morocco, as 
migrant smuggling networks find themselves in deep waters with their boats intercepted 
and their business models dismantled (MPR 2007:15). The following year saw 
advancements in border management and legal migration as the continuation of the 
cooperation programme with the Union for the purpose of strengthening Morocco’s 
territorial borders were deemed ‘satisfactory’, as dialogue and information exchanges 
on tackling legal migration issues continue. The rapporteur makes note of the 
furtherance of dialogue and information exchanges on tackling legal migration issues, 
65 | P a g e  
 
including the first meeting of a working group dedicated to this topic under the Euro-
Med Migration II programme (MPR 2008:15). In the area of irregular migration, the 
rapporteur remarks that though Morocco has made significant headway in curbing 
irregular migration streams through the country, the materialisation of early 
commitments on EC-Morocco readmission and the provision of recognition and legal 
protection to refugees continues to stall. The signing of the Headquarters Agreement 
with the UNHCR has still not brought any concrete improvements in this regard, nor 
has the appointment of an ad hoc committee tasked with analysing asylum management 
and proposing recommendations (MPR 2008:15).  
Advancements in border management and cooperation in handling legal and illegal 
migration continue to progress over the course of 2009, with Moroccan-Spanish 
cooperation on curbing illegal migration singled out as an important factor. However, 
the legal structure required for readmission schemes to be implemented remain stalled, 
and the country continues to lack behind in its formulation of a legal structure that 
allows for recognition of refugee and asylum seeker status, instead relying heavily on 
the UNHCR to handle asylum procedures, and providing them support instead of taking 
charge. The concrete results include better protection and improvement of living 
conditions of those affected by these advancements, the credits of which are explicitly 
ascribed to the closer cooperation between Moroccan institutions, organisations, civil 
society, and the UNHCR (MPR 2009:14,15). The signing of the Headquarters 
Agreement with the UNHCR has, by 2009, not brought any concrete improvements in 
this respect, nor has the appointment of an ad hoc committee tasked with analysing 
asylum management and proposing recommendations (MPR 2008:15). 
Lack of substantial progress is also observed in Morocco’s handlings of irregular 
migration, with the ongoing absence of national legal and institutional frameworks on 
asylum and on status recognition for refugees and asylum seekers resulting in asylum 
procedures remaining to be handled exclusively by the UNHCR (MPR 2010:15).  
The third priority concerns the enhancement of counterterrorism cooperation and  the 
curbing of organised crime. The 2007 Progress Report only briefly mentioned  anti-
terror initiatives following a series of terrorist attacks (MPR 2007:6), but threads in 
much more detail when addressing the topics of and organised crime. Here, the 
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rapporteur is cautiously positive about the developments. Morocco has made progress in 
strengthening its cooperation with European partners on counterterrorism cooperation, 
receiving training and technical assistance, as well as reaching several bilateral 
agreements with individual Member States to restrict the rise of Al Qa’ida in the 
Maghreb. However, an agreement to combat human trafficking and accede to protocols 
of the UN Conventions against Transnational Organised Crime and the Prevention of 
Trafficking in Women and Children (henceforth: UNCTOC and UNCPTWC) remain 
unresolved, and the implementation of its earlier suggested national anti-drugs strategy 
has only been partially effective, with progress in decreasing cultivation of cannabis 
being offset by the increase in transit of hard drugs through its territory. The work that 
was put into combating money laundering has paid off, though, with 2007 seeing the 
launch of a new supportive twinning operation with Morocco’s Union partners 
following transposition into law of the anti-money laundering act and its review of the 
establishment of a Financial Intelligence Processing Unit. Beyond this, the rapporteur 
notes that judicial and police cooperation is developing steadily, and notes in particular 
its active participation in the Euro-Med Justice Programme (MPR 2007:15). In contrast, 
the developments in initiatives aimed at countering organised crime only come up 
briefly the year after, mentioning advancements in combating cannabis cultivation and 
production, that nine of the country’s regions implemented a national awareness 
campaign against money laundering, and that the Council of Ministers approved of the 
decree establishing the Financial Processing and Information Unit. No mention is made 
of advancements in judicial and police cooperation between Morocco and EU Member 
States. The rapporteur does makes observation of Morocco’s accession to two Protocols 
to UNCTOC and UNCPTWC by 2009, providing the country with a stronger legal basis 
from which to combat illicit firearm trafficking and production, and trafficking of 
women and children(MPR 2008:15). He also notes that, by 2009, advancements are 
made in the area of combating drug crime. The national anti-drug strategy continues to 
be rolled out, with Morocco bolstering its bilateral cooperation with Spain and France in 
combating the transport of cannabis across the Mediterranean, whilst disincentivising 
cultivation through a directed socio-economic development programme and more 
stringent prevention efforts. At the same time, whilst cultivation and transport of 
cannabis are decreasing, the rapporteur notes that consumption of hard drugs is 
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increasing. To combat this, the Moroccan Ministry of Health has established specialised 
medical-psychological centres and has started training doctors, psychologists and other 
stakeholders (MPR 2009:15). In addition to this, the rapporteur also makes note of the 
furtherance of Morocco’s establishment of a legal framework within which it can 
effectively combat money laundering, mentioning its partial adherence to international 
and EU standards. The rapporteur then goes on to suggest three focal points to bring the 
framework more in line with the requirements set out in the Action Plan. The legal 
framework itself requires an expansion of the criteria for establishing cases of money 
laundering, and an explicit reference to the punishable nature of this act, even when it is 
committed outside of Morocco’s territorial borders. The rapporteur is also of opinion 
that normative developments are required in order to foster an environment of 
preventing money laundering (MPR 2009:15). At this point, pursuance of legal and 
police cooperation between Morocco and the EU has been mostly satisfactory. The 
country has shown interest in acceding to the European Convention on Cybercrime, and 
negotiations surrounding the strategic agreement Morocco wanted with Europol are set 
to commence on short notice. Furthermore, Moroccan judges and magistrates have 
enjoyed elaborate trainings to professionalise their knowledge and craft, and Morocco 
continues its participation in the Euro-Med Justice and Police II programmes (MPR 
2009:15,16)  
The rapporteur dedicates a paragraph to explicitly state that, by 2010, the Moroccan 
government still hasn’t acceded to two of the three Palermo Protocols accompanying 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. In contrast, positivity can 
be read into the rapporteur’s assessment of Morocco’s ongoing battle against drug 
trafficking, with the country stating it intends to fully eradicate the cultivation of 
cannabis on its soil by 2018, and a major cocaine and cannabis trafficking network 
stretching from Latin America to Eurafrica having been dismantled in autumn. This is 
in contrast to drug consumption in the country, which has remained stable overall but 
also spreads amongst youth in spite of ongoing efforts by the Moroccan Health Ministry 
to thwart this (MPR 2010:15). The institutional twinning project set up between the EU 
and Morocco for the purpose of promulgating the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit 
drew to a successful close in spring of the year. On this topic, the rapporteur reports 
adherence with international and EU standards, but nevertheless suggests a deeper level 
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of legal foundations upon which to base its criminal and preventive standards is 
necessary. Broader checks and balances will be incorporated in 2011 with a new Anti-
Money Laundering Act that is set to extend the list of punishable acts and reinforces 
alertness and oversight obligations (MPR 2010:16). 
Meanwhile, judicial and police cooperation development remains satisfactory, and 2010 
saw Morocco accede to several international conventions, and continue its constructive 
discussions with Europol and the Council, making use of the discussion fora available 
to it to promote itself as a reliable partner whilst receiving beneficial trainings at the 
same time (MPR 2010:16). 
 
4.1.2 Policy Adaptation and Convergence 2011-2013 
Following the Arab Spring and the introduction of the more for more principle, the EU 
and Morocco further deepened their ties. 
4.1.2.1 Democracy and the rule of law 
The year 2011 saw a major shift take place in Morocco’s political and legal system as a 
new Constitution was voted upon and adopted, restraining some of the power of the 
King in favour of the elected heads of government and cementing into constitutional 
law association and assembly rights (MPR 2011:4), press, freedom of expression, and 
information-accessibility rights, judiciary reforms, and anti-corruption measurements, 
with the rapporteur emphasising the conditional nature of increased support from the 
EU in the area of justice reform by implying that Morocco aiming to match sincere 
expectations of actual progress in line with the EU’s expectations had a role to play in 
the formulation of policy reforms in the areas of judiciary independence and the rights 
of the incarcerated, as well as the manner in which Morocco intends to shake up its 
judiciary hierarchy to accommodate the necessary reforms, as several commitments 
made have yet to materialise in practice. Similar concerns are noted in the 
implementation of anti-corruption measures (MPR 2011:5) and freedom-of-association 
and assembly rights (MPR 2011:4).  These concerns turn out to be warranted the year 
later, as the rapporteur heaps up criticisms ranging from the new government’s inability 
to swiftly transpose constitutional law into national law and absenteeism plaguing the 
national Parliament, to more detailed descriptions of continuing violent repression of 
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dissent and further stalling of justice reforms (MPR 2013:5,6). With regards to the 
justice reforms, the rapporteur makes note of the growing irritation among professionals 
involved with these reforms, as the continuing absence of concrete plans by the 
Moroccan government make it ineligible for EU funds to help pay for setting up the 
necessary infrastructure (MPR 2013:6). This continues the year after, with the 
rapporteur noting that after two years, only a quarter of organic laws and only a third of 
the ordinary laws necessary to fully implement the reforms promised by the 2011 
Constitution had found their way to adoption (MPR 2013:5). Further developments in 
devolvement of responsibilities onto regional governments continue to be stalled, and 
provisions aimed at strengthening civil society received pushback from that very same 
collective, as dialogues broke down over transparency issues. Freedom of speech and 
association rights continue to be repressed by abuse of power of the authorities, without 
a clear line of accountability (MPR 2013:6).  This repression continues both against 
private citizens and legal entities involved as well as against the free press, which is still 
waiting on reform of the Press Code that would provide the minimum of additional 
protections to journalists and bloggers (MPR 2013:6,7). 
4.1.2.2 Protecting human rights 
The rapporteur notes that though the Constitution addresses multiple suggested 
fundamental human rights protection-related measures, for example by solidifying the 
Amazigh language as the country’s official second language and dipping into giving 
regions more autonomy  (MPR 2011:6,7), the accession to, and ratification of, protocols 
and treaties aimed at protecting human rights remain stalled throughout 2011. The same 
is said of transposition of the good intentions into appliable law, particularly in relation 
to providing protections for women, illegal or irregular migrants, and the incarcerated 
(MPR 2011:6).  The rapporteur is similarly critical of developments in the area of 
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in the year after, as though Morocco 
takes more action in ascribing to international norms, it reserves many caveats for itself 
that mitigate gains made, or otherwise stalls the signing of the instrument of ratification 
necessary to ensure compliance with human right norms and agreements (MPR 2012:7). 
That does not, however, mean that Morocco is not making headway in strengthening the 
institutional framework necessary to safeguard human rights. It has allowed inquiry into 
reports of abuses of power in the penitentiary system and against migrants (MPR 
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2012:7,8), and is actively cooperating with the EU to empower female participation and 
inclusion as equal members of Moroccan society. Further measures to combat 
discrimination are also in the works, though, again, transposition into law has yet to take 
place (MPR 2012:8). This pattern repeats itself in the report of 2013, where the 
rapporteur highlights a UN report that shows that substantial failures of human right 
protection in the judiciary and penitentiary systems remain commonplace, and 
ratification of the Rome Statute and adoption and implementation of anti-discriminatory 
measurements deemed of relevance continue to either stall or, in the case of approving 
the Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, don’t even make it onto the parliamentary agenda (MPR 2013:7,8). Similar 
shortcomings are observed in Morocco’s approach towards adopting legislation aimed 
at providing basic economic and social rights, with child labour continuing to be 
prevalent throughout the country and international standards pertaining to protecting 
and caring for children not being sufficiently upheld (MPR 2013:8), and vulnerable 
migrants continuing to be subjected to violence, ill treatment, and repulsion from 
national support and protection mechanisms in spite of plans being drawn up to alleviate 
these concerns and EU aid (MPR 2013:9). 
4.1.2.3 Regional and international cooperation on justice, freedom, and security 
As the Arab Spring starts unfolding, the rapporteur remains positive about the 
Moroccan Kingdom’s continued dedication to develop cooperative relations with its 
international partners, noting in particular its granting of the “Partner for Democracy” 
status by the Council of Europe and the deepening of collaborative efforts between 
Morocco, the CoE, and the EU. The country actively participates in the European Police 
Academy and is working on improving cross-border judicial and police cooperation 
(MPR 2011:13). The rapporteur also notes that the new Constitution’s criminalisation of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes is a concrete step towards the 
country ratifying the Statute of the International Criminal Court (MPR 2011:12). On the 
topic of legal migration and border management, he describes Morocco’s willingness to 
further reforms with the EU’s support, but follows up by reporting the country’s 
continuing reluctance to push for progressive reforms of its legislation surrounding 
asylum and refugees (MPR 2011:12).  More progress was reported in relation to 
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Morocco’s reforms aimed at combating organised crime, where it continues to improve 
its measurements against the organised drug trade and human trafficking, as well as 
implementing support measures to help fight addiction (MPR 2011:13). As a partner on 
the international arena, Morocco continues its positive trend of proactively and 
constructively participating in in cooperative schemes and dispute resolution attempts 
throughout 2012, even warming up further to cooperation with neighbouring states 
(MPR 2012:8,9). This careful positivity of the rapporteur is extended towards 
Morocco’s commitment to securing a mobility partnership being presented as a sign of 
further improving EU-Morocco relations, for example by implying that the inclusion of 
international protection and asylum rights in the partnership will lead to broad support 
(MPR 2012:15). After sketching a positive framework for the future, the rapporteur 
turns his attention to current shortcomings, noting that the Moroccan government 
continues to fall short on expectations in regard to implementation and transposition 
into national law of made commitments. In his criticism, the rapporteur particularly 
singles out Morocco’s non-implementation of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, that Morocco acceded 
to in 2011, noting that, despite EU-funded support schemes being in place, the national 
penal code has not been updated accordingly, disrupting the judiciary’s capacity to 
handle related matters adequately, for example in cases where ambiguous legal 
grounding makes it impossible to legally differentiate between human traffickers and 
migrant smugglers. The rapporteur furthermore notes a lack of developments in 
combating organised crime in 2012, except for in the field of combating drug 
trafficking, though he also notes that the ongoing instability in the region may be in part 
to blame for this (MPR 2012:15). In regards to political dialogue aimed at deepening 
international and regional cooperation, Morocco continues its proactive approach 
throughout 2013, to which the EU and Morocco set up several sub-committees to 
discuss horizontal collaboration of the acumination of justice and security, social, 
migration, agriculture, and fishery affairs. Morocco also obtained observer status in an 
EU-initiated programme aimed at democratic reform strengthening in the Southern 
neighbourhood, and its status of “partner of democracy” was formally and unanimously 
adopted by the Council of Europe (MPR 2013:9,10). Besides this, bi- and multilateral 
dialogues continued, though the report does not specify the outcomes thereof beyond 
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further commitments towards securitising the region and enhancing trade relations 
(MPR 2013:10). With regards to Morocco’s commitments in the areas of reforms that 
better the conditions under which regular and irregular migrants are treated, a 
comprehensive immigration and asylum policy has been devised to facilitate the 
implementation of legal and institutional measures that cover their rights, and several 
measures have been agreed upon with the EU in order to foster cooperation on 
establishing ways to handle the challenges that come with protecting those (MPR 
2013:17,18). In light of Morocco’s deliverance of a concrete strategy with which to 
tackle its challenges concerning the integration and reintegration of migrants, the EU set 
up a support structure to help combat human trafficking, and further bi- and multilateral 
cooperative platforms are established between Morocco, Spain, and the EU for 
combating drug and trafficking crime by means of both directly providing support to 
crimefighting activities, but also by supporting regional socio-economic development 
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4.2 Egypt 
 This case study examines the extent to which the Barcelona converge with the concrete 
measures flowing out of the EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan and logged by the ENP 
Progress Reports. The first part looks at the extent to which adaptation of the measures 
in the three categories under examination converge with the adaptation of the Action 
Plan in the period of 2007 until and including 2010, whilst the second part looks at this 
for the period from 2011 until and including 2013. 
4.2.1 Policy Adaptation and Convergence 2007-2010 
4.2.1.1 Democracy and the rule of law 
The ENP-Egypt Action Plan stipulates the enhancement of democracy and rule of law 
promoting institutions as conduits of civil society, judiciary reform, and prison reform 
(European Commission, 2007c:5,6). The rapporteur kicks off the 2007 EU-Egypt 
Progress Report by evaluating the expected outcome of constitutional reforms that 
passed earlier in the year. Immediately, a note is made of the opportunity for the state of 
emergency being lifted, as this would restore impaired civil rights. These reforms also 
affect electoral law, with the first post-amendment election registering a low voter 
turnout. Early steps were taken in setting up an effective anti-corruption strategy and in 
developing a clearer judicial independency by means of providing tools, trainings, and 
funds. Finally, the rapporteur was critical about prison conditions and prisoner rights, 
but noted Egyptian commitment towards improvement (EPR 2007:3,4) When the state 
of emergency is extended, rather than lifted, the year after, the rapporteur verbally 
iterates and emphasises that the EU’s position on this matter is one of ‘regret’. The 
ramifications of this action are expected to hinder the legitimacy of rulings by the 
judiciary as civilian court cases can be replaced by special courts with little oversight or 
accountability.  Egypt is making headways into reforming the administration of justice, 
but needs also address concerns pertaining to undue influences from the executive 
branch. New electoral legislation continues to be drafted, as Egypt declined the EU’s 
assistance in improving the electoral framework, and the Egyptian government is 
working on transposing into law the mechanisms necessary to provide better and more 
locally tailored public services and to battle centralised and localised corruption, both in 
the national and international arena (EPR 2008:4,5). With progress on counter-terrorism 
legislation proceeding slowly, the state of emergency is not revoked by 2009, further 
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blocking the path for judiciary independence reforms. Reforming the justice 
administration has already proven more successful, with a series of measures improving 
legal assistance and literature accessibility, automating processes in court, and by 
introducing a committee capable of monitoring economic courts.  The rapporteur does 
make note of Egypt’s continued rejection of offers of technical support for the 
upcoming elections and its stalling of adopting pre-trial detention related amendments 
that it has already committed to, but he is more positive about the anti-corruption and 
decentralisation measures being proposed, developed, and finalised (EPR 2009:3,4). 
Elections were held in 2010 to decide Egypt’s representatives for the upper and lower 
chamber, leading to victory by the National Democratic Party in both cases. The 
rapporteur notes multiple irregularities being described by different actors of society, 
ranging from accusations of election rigging to literal voter repression. A small pro 
coming from this election is that the quota of female inclusion in the representative 
chambers was achieved, though one may argue about the legitimacy of such a vote with 
Egypt refusing international and independent electoral observation, as turn-out figures 
inconclusively vary between 5 and 23%. Additionally, the state of emergency got 
extended until 2012 in spite of commitments to end it, leading to further stalling of 
realising an independent judiciary, though some practical improvements of the 
administration of justice and local administration reforms continue to spark hope of 
improving access to justice and public services. This careful positivity is also evident in 
the rapporteur’s reporting on the anti-corruption measures, as implementation of the UN 
Convention against Corruption is being supported by an EU programme and 
transparency improvements are recorded. 
4.2.1.2 Protecting human rights 
In the area of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, the AP’s priorities 
stretch over five fields. These identified fields are general human rights and freedoms, 
the rights of women and children, the right to freedom of association, expression, and 
media plurality, the right not to be discriminated against, and the right to social and 
labour standards (European Commission, 2007c:6-8). To promote and protect human 
rights in Egypt, the National Council for Human Rights (henceforth: NCHR) set up a 
national plan aiming to institutionalise inclusion of human rights considerations. The 
rapporteur makes note of Egypt’s to “..promote human rights at the international level, 
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while also adhering to its undertakings on strengthening human rights in the domestic 
context, promoting the role of NGOs, and preserving the freedom of the press and the 
independence of the judiciary”(EPR 2007:4). The national human rights strategy was 
finished in 2008, as the NCHR raised its visibility and outreach by receiving and 
formally forwarding 6677 individual complaints, through its condemnation and 
reporting of torture, and its questioning of the legitimacy of the Emergency Law (EPR 
2008:5).  
Though Egypt has already acceded and signed several international and regional human 
rights instruments, it has yet to ratify several of them, most notably that of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. The country still imposes the death penalty, and retains reservations 
to the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women. It 
also has regulatory constraints on the activities of civil society organisations, and 
freedom of expression is under stress from media crackdowns (EPR 2007:4,5). In 2008, 
Egypt was one of the world’s first ratifying parties of the Convention of Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. However, no progress was made on other human rights 
related convention ratifications, and Egypt voted against a global halt on the death 
penalty. Little movement is made in bettering prison conditions or guaranteeing 
expression and association freedoms, nor on combating right violations of migrants, 
refugees, asylum seekers and women, but children have seen their rights expanded 
(EPR 2008:7,8).  
2009 saw much work take place in preparation for 2010’s Universal Periodic Review 
under the Human Rights Council, with consultations and discussions between the 
government, civil society organisations, and other stakeholders resulting in a total of 65 
recommendations made, of which 19 were accepted. The  NCHR increased its outreach 
further by cooperating with the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office and by merit of its 
fast reports. Meanwhile, incompatibilities between Islamic and international law stalled 
acceding to the optional protocols of human rights instruments, the death penalty 
remains on the table, and torture and ill treatment remain prevalent in interactions 
between state authorities and private citizens. The new Constitution guarantees freedom 
of expression, association an assembly, and belief and practice of religion. Though 
packing out well for the first, the latter two still face several practical challenges 
unifying constitutional and ordinary law (EPR 2009:5). Less well-off are migrants, 
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refugees, and asylum seekers, who continue to have their rights violated through 
murder, pushbacks, and unfair arrests and trials. The promotion of women’s rights is 
slowly progressing, though, with a new strategy to combat violence against women and 
draft legislation against sexual harassment in the works. The rapporteur found it 
worthwhile to note that 2009 saw the first person charged for performing female genital 
mutilation as a milestone, before reporting solid progress in child right promotion and 
protection (EPR 2009:6).  
The results of the Universal Periodic Review led to Egypt adopting a series of 
recommendations aimed at improving its position as guarantor of fundamental human 
rights, but the government also rejected a series of recommendations, perhaps most 
notably on the topic of abolishing the death penalty. There was no significant change 
reported concerning prisoner rights, but the reformulation of the definition of torture in 
line with the UN terminology is expected to raise opportunities to hold abusers to 
account. Egypt also continues to ignore calls by the UN for a Rapporteur on Torture to 
visit (EPR 2010:5,6). None of the three constitutional freedoms of expression, 
assembly, and of belief are harmoniously being absorbed into national law, with the 
widening of the freedom of expression’s scope over the past years being narrowed back 
down over rising tensions in late 2010, the freedom of association and assembly 
continuing to be blocked by the Emergency and NGO law, and the continuing religious 
and sectarian violence leaving dead religious minorities behind (EPR 2010:6). Neither 
has Egypt taken adequate measures to prepare its legislation and infrastructure for the 
promotion or securing of rights of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, for example 
by clinging on to its reservations on the Geneva Convention. The materialisation of 
commitments towards promoting and protecting rights of women have also stalled, with 
no clear indication of expected reforms. Few reforms were pushed through in 2010 for 
the protection of children’s rights (EPR 2010:7). 
 
4.2.1.3 Regional and international cooperation on justice, freedom, and security 
In the areas of regional and international cooperation and security, the Action Plan lays 
out four key priorities to be pursued, three of which will be examined below. These are 
to enhance political dialogue and cooperation when common interests are at stake, 
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develop cooperative means of handling issues, conflicts and crises,  counterterrorism 
cooperation, and non-proliferation and anti-illegal arms export cooperation (European 
Commission, 2007c:8-10). Egypt’s prominence in the Arab League plays an important 
role in the Arab Peace Initiative, and Egypt and the EU agree on the need for full 
implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access. (EPR 
2007:6). Egypt’s commitment to fostering common ground with the EU on security 
matters continues through 2008, as it takes upon itself the co-presidency of the UfM and 
positions itself as an important mediator between Palestinian factions (EPR 2008:8), 
and proactively facilitates a variety of dialogues, forms of assistance, and other aid in 
the Arab League and the African Union, positioning itself as a partner that opens door 
for the EU in Africa (EPR 2009:7). In 2010, Egypt played an instrumental peace in the 
relaunch of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and continued carving out its 
prominent role in African security-building by investing in developments and 
reconstructions in Sudan and Darfur, as well as mediate between North and South 
Sudan (EPR 2010:8). It was also permitted into a select group of countries with which 
the EU is ready to conclude crisis management operation agreements, as its successful 
co-presidency of the UfM came to an end (EPR 2010:8) 
In 2007, Egyptian government is also proactively engaging in counterterror efforts by 
cooperating with the EU and developing a counterterrorism law in line with 
international agreements and expectations, particularly focusing on the role of the 
internet in (EPR 2007:6). This focus is continued over 2008, as Egypt seeks to find a 
balance between freedom of expression rights and control over internet site used for 
terrorist purposes. Challenges related to civil right protections led to further stalling of 
the counterterrorism law (EPR 2008:9), and even a visit by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Protection of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism led to diminishable 
returns. Egypt remains very focused on prospects of fighting the online dissemination of 
terrorism-related materials, though it receives little support in this over freedom of 
expression concerns (EPR 2009:7). By 2010, there has still been no progress regarding 
the drafting of new anti-terrorism legislation, though Egypt does express willingness to 
foster deeper cooperation in counterterror initiatives with the EU. No direct suggestions 
were made by the rapporteur on how this could materialise. (EPR, 2010:8).  
2007 saw Egypt continuing its established policy to pursue disarmament and non-
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proliferation, particularly focused on ridding the Middle-East of nuclear weaponry, 
while remaining open to international checks and balances on the use of nuclear power 
for energy (EPR 2007:6). To this end, the European Commission has offered technical 
assistance and support (EPR 2008:9), and Egypt has asked for a Non-Proliferation 
Treaty review and an increase of dialogues related to denuclearising the Middle-East. 
However, the possibility of clearing up old mines in Sinai and El Alamein is hindered 
by Egypt’s not signing the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction 
(EPR 2009:7). Cooperation in the field of particularly nuclear disarmament between 
Egypt and the EU, noted as one of Egypt’s key security interests, continues to deepen, 
with regular political dialogue being established (EPR 2010:8). 
4.2.2 Policy Adaptation and Convergence 2011-2013 
2011 was a turbulent year for the Arab Republic of Egypt. Following mass protests, 
power is placed firmly in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(henceforth: SCAF),which decided to leave engagement with long-term objectives and 
social and economic reform to the next democratically elected government (EPR 
2011:3), leading to the formal suspension of the ENP until early 2013 (EPR 2011:2). 
The European Commission nevertheless continued its annual progress reports, though 
there were clear ramifications of the suspension that were detrimental to the quality of 
the reports.  
4.2.2.1 Democracy and the rule of law 
The transition of power towards a military-ran government was swift, but SCAF 
originally promised democratic elections within the year, they were subsequently 
postponed. Contrary to earlier years, Egypt was willing to let international observers not 
aligned to governments follow the elections, though no EU observation mission was 
agreed upon. In preparation for a peaceful transition of power to a democratically 
elected civilian government, constitutional reforms were put to a referendum and 
convincingly adopted in what the rapporteur explicitly states as “Egypt’s freest vote in 
decades” (EPR 2011:4). Parliamentary elections were held in November 2011 and 
March 2012, and largely free presidential elections shortly thereafter, to which half of 
the eligible voters turned up. The new government, led by President Morsi, partially 
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lifted the state of emergency, though it did not address the legitimacy of the military 
courts nor help those already convicted or being prosecuted. Neither did it address the 
necessity to update the NGO law. However, substantial corruption cases are brought 
forward and perpetrators prosecuted. Cases of fraudulent land sales by the previous 
government were uncovered and annulled, and the President both set up a committee to 
investigate abuses against demonstrators and made the military establishment 
subordinate to the President (ENP PR 2012:5,6). The holding and passing of a 
referendum vote for a new constitution led to widespread demonstrations, with Morsi’s 
Muslim Brotherhood party left ousted, banned, stripped of its finances, and branded a 
terrorist organisation (EPR 2013:4,5). Transitional justice and the independence of the 
judiciary didn’t fare much better, as international observers were denied permission 
investigate, and the judiciary branch delivered verdicts that can be interpreted as being 
politically motivated, while military courts continued to try civilians and extend its 
influence on political decision-making processes (EPR 2013: 6). 
4.2.2.2 Protecting human rights 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are fragile matters, and the Arab Spring 
proved how quickly a government like Egypt can slide back towards more autocratic 
forms of governance led by unilateral decisiveness instead of civil society deliberation. 
Directly after taking power, SCAF took the decision to subdue the judiciary, and crack 
down on demonstrators, civil society organisations, and the media for its purposes. 
Here, the rapporteur notes numerous concerns, stating that Egypt leaped backwards 
metaphorically, looking at the way in which the government restricted access to social 
media, gagged the old media with criminal sentencing behind the closed doors of 
military tribunals, and leave little to no means of safeguarding accountability, and 
literally in his mention of the country’s drop to the 112th position in the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index (EPR 2011:4,5). The escalation of violence 
came to a peak when the government used excessive force against two groups of 
demonstrators, killing over 1000 people in the process. A new law was introduced 
following a two-month state of emergency that led to further withering of democratic 
values, as well as further protests and subsequent government crackdowns against said 
protests (EPR 2013:5,6). Meanwhile, it is reported that the death penalty is increasingly 
relied on as the revolution has led to an increase in martial courts taking place, as 
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hundreds claim they’ve been tortured. To boot, all the careful optimism constructed 
over the ENP Progress reports with regards to securing women’s rights is wiped out by 
2011’s revelation that women are subjected to discrimination and abuse by male 
soldiers and security forces. Same goes for the rights of children, which has notably 
worsened since the Arab Spring began. Similarly for the right to religious freedom, as 
sectarian violence and religious bigotry clouds the judgment of those meant to lead 
(EPR 2011:6). The rapporteur notes not a single concrete improvement in the area of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms protection in the two years that follow, just 
listening established reasons why the priorities addressed are failing to be met (EPR 
2012:5-7) (EPR 2013; 4-7). 
4.2.2.3 Regional and international cooperation on justice, freedom, and security 
In spite of the unrest in the country’s internal affairs, Egypt remained a dedicated 
partner in the Middle East Peace Process throughout 2011, bringing Israel and Palestine 
a step closer towards reconciliation even as relations between Egypt and Israel 
deteriorated (EPR 2011:6). The rapporteur credits the Egypt President and his team for 
their role in facilitating talks resulting in the Gaza ceasefire of 2012 (EPR 2012:7), but 
the ousting of the leader dampened the relationship between Egypt and Hamas, 
effectuated by Egypt’s willingness to permit Israeli military action and cooperation in 
the Sinai region against Takfiri and Jihadi groups that both attacked Israel and harmed 
Egypt’s internal interests (EPR 2013:8). The country also acted as an important player 
during the Libyan Crisis, and has expressed its will to reaffirm and redevelop relations 
with all African countries (EPR 2011:6), a dedication that found continuation through 
2012, with Egypt being represented at the African Union Summit by its President for 
the first time in thirteen years (EPR 2012:7), but the country found itself suspended 
from the African Union following its undemocratic shift of government (EPR 2013:9). 
As the Arab Spring drastically lowers the prospects of cooperation on many fronts due 
to the damming of the political establishment in preparation for a peaceful transition of 
power, counterterrorism initiatives are no longer discussed by the rapporteur within the 
context of regional and international cooperation. Egypt’s commitment towards 
disarmament, however, continue to be advocated for by its diplomats as a key priority 
(EPR 2011:6) (EPR 2012:8) (EPR 2013:9) 
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4.3 Discussion 
The above cases describe the respective development of several of the normative 
priorities agreed upon between the European Union and Southern ENP Partner States, 
established through the Barcelona Agreement, legalised by the Association Agreements, 
and brought to execution by means of neighbourhood downloading of policies through 
the ENP Action Plans. In chapter one, the framework of Europeanisation was laid out 
and operationalised, and the factors of norm diffusion explained. In this paragraph, the 
descriptive data collected from the case studies will be put into the perspective of 
Europeanisation to see whether the EU’s narrative is vested in the diffusion of norms, or 
the securing of interests. The similarities and differences between the way in which the 
social, political, and legal infrastructures of the two countries have developed in light of 
the normative priorities become particularly visible when looking at the reported 
developments following both the change in the weight of conditionality in receiving 
support and the political turmoil of 2011 onwards. 
Looking at how the reports are constructed, it is evident that the two countries had very 
different approaches in how they made use of the opportunities brought about through 
their ENP partnerships with the EU. Morocco proactively participated in, and got EU 
support for, initiatives that fostered democratisation and the strengthening of civil 
society, the rule of law, and fundamental human rights, diffusing into its national 
legislature measures that established or solidified the infrastructure necessary. It 
allowed EU and international observers to observe elections taking place, saw the 
reformation, and, where possible, simplification, of laws and procedures aimed at 
enhancing citizens’ accessibility to crucial services and information, and many bi- and 
multilateral focus and support structures have been set between Morocco and the EU, 
and in some cases Morocco and one or more individual Member States, to help 
Moroccan society transition towards a more sustainable democracy that treasures 
fundamental human rights and the rule of law. However, the rapporteur indicated that 
many of the commitments and good intentions of Morocco were not executed with the 
same enthusiasm as with which they were promoted, for example with regards to justice 
and freedom of information, speech, and association rights, in part flowing from 
challenges in uniting constitutional law with ordinary law. The country also expressed 
commitment to signing on to, and implementing, many international agreements and 
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instruments, but generally steered short of definitively latching on. Furthermore, its 
government was left relatively untarnished after the mass demonstrations of 2011, 
allowing for the continuation of progressive reforms without too much hinder. 
With Egypt, most of the progress that was reported appeared to be in line with Egyptian 
security interests, while the implementation of more normative aspects of the ENP were 
generally unsuccessful. The EU found a dependable partner in Egypt in external conflict 
mediation and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but saw few opportunities 
to diffuse European norms and values into the Egyptian governing system. Instead, 
proposals and criticisms related to the topics of democratisation, the rule of law, and the 
protection of human rights were consistently pushed to the side as multiple transitions 
of power made consistent development of civil society in the country all but impossible. 
The EU found itself stuck with a partner that continually stalled materialisations of 
commitments that would better citizen life but would complicate that of its government. 
After the suspension of the ENP, the mannerism, style, and quality of content of the 
reports seemingly changed, and with no positive progress concerning normative 
diffusion, the rapporteur’s listings of faults and criticisms lay bare the EU’s inability to 
project its norms and values onto Egyptian society successfully.  
Concerning the diffusion of democratic, human right and fundamental freedoms, and 
rule-of-law related norms, in Morocco’s case, though improvements can still be made, 
civil society had been benefitting substantially from the transposition of European 
norms and values into the country’s social, political, and legal structures. Meanwhile, in 
Egypt, where the government actively stalled, rejected, and otherwise impaired the 
opportunities for civil society to institutionalise itself, and citizens are more secure or 
empowered than they did before, if not less so. There are also similarities to be observed 
with regards to the challenges in practical application of the rights to freedom of 
expression, association and assembly, and religion, as neither country was able to fully 
implement measures to these ends. For example, violations of normative standards 
pertaining to the development of freedom of expression rights in in Morocco were 
continuously reported as  development on the Press code, which started in 2007, but had 
seen no concrete progress reported upon by 2013, froze. Meanwhile, the Egyptian 
government cracked down harshly on its press in the period leading up to and following 
the Arab Spring. A lot of similarities were reported between Morocco and Egypt related 
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to the respective partner countries’ unwillingness to accede to or ratify international 
conventions, statutes, and protocols, some of which already signed, for example in case 
of their mutual unwillingness to abolish the death penalty or sign up to the ICC, both 
actions opposed by the EU, and in relation to international standards on organised 
crime, torture, and migrant-, children-, and women’s rights protections. Meanwhile, 
participation of the two Partner States in bi- and multilateral dialogue and cooperation 
platforms has intensified over the years examined, which has led to the centrality of 
peace taking an ever more prominent role in the States’ foreign relations. To this end, 
both Morocco and Egypt have presented themselves to be reliable but very different 
partners, with Morocco fostering regional security and stability through its participation 
in the ALTEA operation, crisis management and conflict prevention efforts, and even 
pushing for the further diffusion of democracy, good governance, and human rights 
protection among its African partners. Egypt, in contrast, focuses on positioning itself as 
a strategically relevant and valuable player in peace and crisis mitigation negotiations, 
as it has done in relation to Libya, Sudan, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Although it would be attractive to draw the conclusion that this means that the ENP is 
values based, it is important not to fall into the pitfall of cum hoc ergo propter hoc, 
where correlation in mistaken for causality. The fact of the matter remains that the 
successful implementation of many of these values-based considerations either stall or 
have their effectiveness mitigated by lack of further measures, or are sometimes 
reimagined as serving national security interests, as evidenced by the contrast between 
Morocco’s and Egypt’s handling of implementing ENP priorities. 
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5. Conclusion 
This study analyses the role of European value diffusion by tracing how European 
values are transposed into national law by two of its Southern Partner States, Morocco 
and Egypt. This is done by looking at the Rapporteur’s observations concerning the 
extent to which the normative factors identified in Chapter one, in particular those of 
‘centrality of peace’, ‘democracy’, and ‘rule of law’ (Manners, 2002:242), find 
themselves transposed into the socio-political and legal systems of the third party 
Partner States.  
Using Europeanisation as the overarching analytical framework, the cases of Morocco 
and Egypt are compared on the premise of their respective levels of policy adoption 
from – and policy convergence with – the European Union. Similarities and 
discrepancies in the approach taken by the Rapporteur in interpreting the progress on 
key priorities of the ENP Action plans are put into the perspective of European norm 
diffusion versus national interest securitisation. By clearly defining what the subject of 
study is, the methodological approach taken allows for generalisation of the research 
results and reproduction and application of the methodology on other Southern ENP 
Partner States. This contributes to the field of Europeanisation studies by presenting a 
new way in which to use established methods to interpret the construction of the EU’s 
narrative towards norm diffusion towards third countries by means of the 
implementation of ENP priorities, paving the way more in-depth research on how to 
further external norm diffusion effectively.   
The case studies show that the normative values of the European Union are at least in 
part absorbed into the social, political, and legal fabric of its Southern ENP Partner 
States of Morocco and Egypt, though set expectations of norm diffusion in the areas of 
democracy, peace, and the rule of law have largely proven too ambitious to realise in a 
short timeframe.  
In addition, the very fact that the European Union is able to levy its institutions and 
human and financial resources to affect policy change in these countries means that 
supranational projection channelled through the European Neighbourhood Policy has 
affected the adoption of policies by these two countries that put them on a path of 
convergence with EU standards, in effect transforming aspects of the construction of the 
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socio-political normative identity of the Partner States so as to closer emulate that of EU 
Member States.  
Looking at the manner in which the European Commission’s rapporteurs take note of 
the extent to which normative measures are enacted in the Partner State under review, it 
can furthermore be concluded that the narration of the handling of provisions pertaining 
to the development of democracy and the rule of law, human rights and freedoms, and 
peace, follows values-based considerations in which the rapporteur continually makes 
note of possible reform opportunities and pitfalls that may affect the promotion and 
consolidation of those values as they come up. Thus, it can be concluded that the EU’s 
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